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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines how Olive Schreiner’s The Story of an African Farm (South 
Africa) and Wilson Harris’s Palace of the Peacock (Guyana) can be read as parodic, 
postcolonial rewritings of the biblical creation story in the first chapter of Genesis.
The Introduction briefly defines the term "postcolonial" as it is used in the thesis. 
Part One introduces Schreiner and gives some biographical/textual background that 
prepares the ground for an examination of the novel in a postcolonial context. Then, by 
way o f preface to the argument about Story, the thesis looks at how another, more 
obviously postcolonial author, Harris, revises the Genesis account in his Palace.
Part Two focuses entirely on Story, with a careful look at the "Times and 
Seasons" chapter, a peculiar bridge between the novel’s two parts that can be read as 
Schreiner’s seven-stage allegorization of the Genesis One account of creation, an account 
that is founded upon a system of binary oppositions (e.g. light/dark). I argue that her 
revision (or parody) departs structurally from the Genesis model in two ways: first, 
Schreiner’s seven-stage allegory only loosely follows the order of the biblical narrative, 
eventually abandoning the Genesis order altogether and assuming an "order" of its own; 
and second, pervading Schreiner’s allegory is a dichotomy—divine justice versus mercy— 
that is nowhere present in the biblical creation account, but is raised only in later chapters 
o f Genesis. Schreiner’s "beginning," then, is contaminated by ideas that are not really a 
part o f the biblical beginning; this reordering and confusion of the biblical text 
exemplifies the novel’s postcolonial condition.
After this close examination of Schreiner’s parody of the first chapter of Genesis, 
the thesis concludes with a very brief look at both Schreiner’s and Harris’s endings, 
noting how the late-nineteenth century novelist remains ensconced within the framework 
of binary oppositions from which she is trying to wrest herself free, while Harris comes 
closer to achieving what we might call a postmodern movement out of the inherent 
dichotomies of language.
POSTCOLONIAL PARODIES OF THE CREATION STORY 
IN OLIVE SCHREINER AND WILSON HARRIS
“He saw the blind dream of creation crumble as it was re-enacted.”
Wilson Harris, Palace o f the Peacock
INTRODUCTION: “THE POST-COLONIAL IS DEAD; LONG LIVE
POSTCOLONIALISM”
In 1989, three Australian writers—Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen 
Tiffin—published The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial 
Literatures, the first (and ten years later still very much a standard) introduction to the 
burgeoning field of post-colonial studies. In a 1991 critique of this book, Vijay Mishra 
and Bob Hodge begin with a question that inevitably lies at the root of any scholarly 
discussion regarding post-colonial discourse (and which thus also lies at the root of the 
present study): namely, "What is post(-)colonialism?" Historically speaking, they note, 
the term emerged as a replacement for "Commonwealth Literature," a concept that came 
to be seen as ambiguous and ideologically loaded both because it subtly reinscribed a 
distinction between the center (Britain) and its margins (the Commonwealth) and because 
it implied a false unity between the former imperial power and its colonies. By contrast, 
the replacement term foregrounded the political/cultural struggles between center and 
periphery, and abetted the "destabilization of the barriers around 'English Literature' that 
protected the primacy of the canon and the self-evidence of its standards" (Hodge 399).
However, since its advent, the term "post-colonial" has created more confusion 
than it has resolved. In recent years an increasing number o f critics have started both to 
expose and collapse the assumptions inherent within the term “post-colonial” in
2
3whichever of its many contexts it is used (e.g., describing certain societies and their 
histories; categorizing the literatures these societies have produced; or designating an 
entire academic discourse)1. In each such context, questions of the following sort 
resonate deeply: “When was ‘the post-colonial?’” (Hall 242). What literatures can fall 
under its rubric? Does its ostensibly definitive periodisation (past colonization) refer to a 
chronological break in two histories, or to a rupture between two ways of understanding 
those histories; in other words, is the “post-colonial” an historical or an epistemological 
term? Is it both?
Perhaps the best place to start is with a reiteration of the problematic binaries that 
are implicit in the term “post-colonial.” The mere presence of the hyphen would seem to 
indicate a simple division between the purely “colonial” and the purely “post” (or past, 
both temporally and ideologically) colonial. Historically, a country would be colonial 
only as long as it was occupied by the colonizer, and would become post-colonial after 
the demise of imperial rule. Transposing this logic to the literary realm, a “colonial” text 
would be one produced during colonial rule, would attempt to repeat the center on the 
periphery, and would not intend any revision of the central tenets o f colonial power (e.g. 
white supremacy, Christianity, etc.). A “post-colonial” text, then, would be one written 
after colonial occupation and would consciously and intentionally revise and/or reject the 
literary and ideological traditions of the imperial center. Viewed in this way, the 
movement from the colonial to the post-colonial would be linear and chronological—a 
definitive moment in history, with the spaces on either side marked accordingly.
However, as critics like Hodge and Mishra, Ella Shohat, Stuart Hall, and others
have almost unanimously pointed out, this type of binary logic is easily deconstructed, as 
neither the wholly “colonial” nor the wholly “post-colonial” text can in fact exist, in the 
same way that neither the wholly colonial nor the wholly post-colonial culture can exist. 
Because the very act of colonization involves the superimposition of one (imperial) 
culture upon another (indigenous) culture, a colonial society will always be a mix of the 
two, a hybridized culture in which the interplay of (often conflicting) ideologies, customs, 
and peoples comes to define the society at large. Likewise, a society that has experienced 
colonialism and its aftermath will never be able fully to return to its pre-colonial 
condition, as the colonial experience leaves its indelible marks (such as racial 
intermixture, religious ideologies, and memories of slavery) on virtually every aspect of 
the culture, including its literatures. The post-colonial text (one produced after the 
official departure of the colonial power) will thus inevitably contain elements of the 
colonial (even as it strives to wrest its freedom from that influence); moreover, the 
colonial work will always already be “post” colonial as it (either consciously or 
unconsciously) wrestles through, and from within, the conflicting cultural biases 
constitutive of colonial societies. Any attempt, therefore, to take a “then and now,” “us 
and them” approach to classing or examining a society and its literary works as “post- 
colonial” is an exercise in futility. One could, in effect, say that the post-colonial was 
dead on arrival.
Faced with this situation, what are critics to do? Are we to throw up our hands in 
the face of an experience and a discourse that resists any kind of black and white 
absolutism? Certainly not. If poststructuralism has taught us anything, it is how to wield
5our scholarly swords among toppling signiflers and signifieds; how to neither collapse 
our opposing categories nor posit any unqualified distinction between them. If we are to 
confront post-colonial discourse, then, it must be with a'sensitivity to the ambivalent 
territories opened up by poststructuralism, as Hodge and Mishra contend. They propose a 
middle ground between the two (impossible) extremes of the colonial and post-colonial: 
namely, the postcolonial (no hyphen), an “always present tendency in any literature of 
subjugation marked by a systematic process of cultural domination through the 
imposition of imperial structures of power . . . [, a] form of ‘postcolonialism’ [that] is not 
‘post-’ something or other but is already implicit in the discourses of colonialism 
themselves” (407). This “complicit postcolonialism” differs from the hyphenated version 
in that it is an ideological orientation rather than an historical stage, an epistemology 
rather than a chronology. It does not attempt to set up a “then” and “now,” “home” and 
“abroad” perspective, but acknowledges the interdependent, symbiotic relationship 
between colonizer and colonized (unlike the more polemical, if  equally ideological, 
perspective of what they call “oppositional post-colonialism”). As Hall points out, 
colonization “was never simply external to the societies of the imperial metropolis. It 
was always inscribed deeply within them as it became indelibly inscribed in the cultures 
o f the colonized” (Hall 246). As Mishra and Hall put it, “the post-colonial is dead; long 
live postcolonialism” (413).
Given this shift away from the post-colonial as a “movement of linear 
transcendence between two mutually exclusive states” toward the postcolonial as an 
inclusive epistemological concept in which center and periphery, before and after, can
6only be understood as they relate to one another, a host of works that would otherwise 
have fallen outside the frame of the post-colonial (e.g., works written by white settlers in 
the colonies, or works written by indigenous authors during the period of colonial 
occupation) can now be examined under the postcolonial rubric. Olive Schreiner’s The 
Story o f an African Farm (1883—henceforth Story) is one such work. As I will be 
arguing, Schreiner’s Story (which until recently would have been classed only as a 
“colonial” work, given the South African Schreiner’s European [English and German] 
ancestry and the century in which she wrote) can be read as an almost quintessentially 
postcolonial text in its repetition and attempted revision of the colonizer’s (Europe’s) 
story of origin—specifically, the Genesis (Chapter One) account of creation in the Bible2.
Part One of this thesis will first introduce Schreiner and give some 
biographical/textual background for an examination of the novel in a postcolonial 
context. Then, by way of preface to my argument about Story. I will be looking at how 
another, more obviously postcolonial author, Guyana’s Wilson Harris, similarly revises 
the Genesis creation account in his Palace of the Peacock (1960); this comparison will 
foreground some of the ways in which Harris and Schreiner differ in their attempts at 
“writing out o f ’ the stories of Empire (and in their degree of “success” at achieving this). 
Part Two will focus entirely on Story, with a careful examination of the “Times and 
Seasons” chapter, a peculiar bridge between the novel’s two parts that can be read as 
Schreiner’s seven-stage allegorization of the Genesis One account of creation. I will 
argue that her revision departs structurally from the Genesis model in two ways: 1) 
Schreiner’s seven-stage allegory, while clearly evoking the seven-day creation narrative
7in Genesis One, only loosely follows the order of that biblical narrative, eventually 
abandoning the Genesis One order altogether and assuming an “order” of its own (e.g., 
the biblical seventh day of rest is displaced to day 5; days 6 and 7 are conflated); and 2) 
pervading Schreiner’s allegory is a dichotomy-divine justice versus mercy—that is 
nowhere present in the Bible’s Genesis One, but is raised only in later chapters of Genesis 
(beginning in Chapter 3).
Schreiner’s “beginning,” then, is contaminated by ideas that are not really a part 
of the biblical beginning; her presentation of the creation story is disorderly not only in its 
“re-ordering” of the creation narrative’s events, but also in its inclusion of biblical 
elements that do not “rightly” belong in Genesis One, but come after it. These two 
structural “failures” evidence the above point that there is always-already an element of 
the postcolonial implicit in the colonial text; that colonial texts might well wish faithfully 
to mimic their “central” models, but of necessity fail in this effort (disordering the 
original story, getting it mixed up with other stories). Schreiner’s Story is more complex 
in that, while it indeed attempts to mimic the central model, it also reveals itself as being 
uneasy with that model, distorting it in an unfaithful manner that will come to be 
associated with texts from the historically post-colonial period (around 1950 and after).
After looking closely at Schreiner’s (un)faithful rendition of the first chapter of 
Genesis, the thesis will conclude with a very brief look at both Schreiner’s and Harris’s 
endings, noting how the late-nineteenth-century novelist remains ensconced within the 
framework of binary oppositions from which she is trying to wrest herself free, while 
Harris comes closer to achieving what we might call a postmodern movement out of the
8inherent dichotomies of language and into a future that could well set the stage for the 
actual passage, at least within literature, into a truly /705?-colonial space.
PART ONE: “THE VEIL OF CREATION”
The ancient Chaldean seer had a vision of a Garden of Eden which lay in a 
remote p a s t. . . We also have our dream of a Garden, but it lies in a distant future.
Olive Schreiner. Woman and Labour
Seven days it had taken to finish the original veil of creation that shaped 
and ordered all things to be solid in the beginning. So the oldest fable ran. Perhaps
seven, too, were needed to strip and subtilize everything.
Wilson Harris, The Secret Ladder
When in 1911 the South African writer Olive Schreiner envisioned the future of
women's struggle for equality, she cast her depiction in biblical terms, describing the
collective "dream of a Garden" as a boat full of "women with oars, rowing hard against
the stream, the horizon they aim to reach veiled in mists, but convinced that what they see
dimly ahead is not a delusion . . . [but] a new Garden of Eden" (quoted in Berkman 158).
Such imaginative re-visionings of the past— specifically the Judeo-Christian past as
recounted in the opening chapters of Genesis— occur time and again in Schreiner's work.
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Take, for example, her reversal of the account of woman as man's “help meet” (Genesis 
2:18;20)3 in “Three Dreams in a Desert”: “And I said, ‘Surely he who stands beside her 
will help her?’ And he beside me answered, ‘He cannot help her: she must help herself. 
Let her struggle till she is strong’” [Dreams 59). Again, in Thoughts on South Africa 
Schreiner uses the image of the tree of life (Genesis 3:22) "under whose protecting 
shadow endless forms of life may spring up and flourish" [Thoughts 355) to describe 
what she in her early years saw as the nurturing role of imperial England, recasting the 
image as a "tree of death" (a "colossal upas-tree" under whose poisonous branches 
"plants, flowers, and animals suffocated" [333]) when she later became critical of 
colonial rule4. Finally, in the example that will occupy us here—The Story of an African 
Farm—Schreiner delineates the seven stages in the creation and development of the 
individual psyche, an account that, I will argue, both loosely mimics and substantially 
revises the seven days of creation as presented in the opening chapter of Genesis.
That Schreiner should be thus concerned with mimicking and rewriting traditional 
biblical tropology can be attributed in part to her childhood rearing in and rejection of the 
Christian faith. Finding it nearly impossible to accept the religious precepts of her 
missionary parents (who preached the inferiority of women to men, the sinfulness of the 
body, and the racial and ethnic superiority of white Britons to all other races), Schreiner 
early counted herself among the damned (Berkman 17)5. Not only did she rebel against 
her parents' teachings, but, at the young age of five, she was unable to reconcile her 
certainty regarding a pervasive cosmic integration (her sense that there was a "unity of all 
things, that they were alive, and that I was a part of them" [Cronwright-Schreiner, Life
11
218]) with the Calvinist emphases on God’s sovereignty, dualism of body and soul, and 
man's depravity versus God's perfection. The stage was thus set for her total rejection of 
the Christian faith at the age of nine, when, after her younger sister Ellie's death, she 
could no longer "accept the ordinary doctrine that [one who died] was living somewhere 
without a body" (219). In later years Schreiner denied the divinity o f Christ (pejoratively 
referring to "Christianity, with its horrible doctrine of man as God!" [Cronwright- 
Schreiner, Letters 307]) and reconceived God-the-Father as a genderless spiritual entity 
fDreams 156).
Despite this complete disavowal of belief in anything that could be deemed 
"traditional" Christianity, the Bible itself continued to play an important role in 
Schreiner's literary works. As scholars almost unfailingly point out, her novels are 
"steeped in biblical syntax" (Berkman 229) and ring with the "sonorous phrases of the 
Old Testament and the striking simplicity of the gospels" (Haynes 76-77) even as they 
contest and revise the central tenets of both Testaments. Certainly Schreiner's religious 
upbringing and subsequent repudiation of the Christian faith (a familiar Victorian 
trajectory) can begin to account for this simultaneous repetition and revision. However, 
this biographical information does not account for Schreiner's particular attention to 
revising the Genesis text. While the Genesis One account, according to traditional 
interpretation, is concerned with the production of order out of chaos by the divine 
establishment of various polarizations (for example, heaven/earth, light/dark, day/night, 
and man/animal), Schreiner’s revision of Genesis One, as mentioned earlier, is more 
concerned with revising a polarization that is not established until Genesis Three: God’s
holiness versus human depravity, God’s wrath versus his love. Indeed, as the seven 
days/stages in the soul’s development progress, it becomes evident that Schreiner’s text 
ultimately aims not just to revise these particular oppositional ideas (even as it 
accomplishes that revision structurally in the two ways outlined earlier), but to escape the 
very notion of binary opposition itself.
Schreiner’s use of the Genesis framework to contest the notion of binary 
opposition, as I will argue in more detail in Part Two of this thesis, is best understood 
within a postcolonial framework. To understand why, one must first understand the 
centrality of the Bible, and Judeo-Christian ideology itself, to the colonial enterprise.
First, on a large scale, one of the pursuits o f the imperial center was to “Christianize the 
heathen.” The idea that the West would be the harbinger of salvation to the “rest” served 
as the major justification for many of the atrocities o f slavery and racial subjugation in the 
colonies (what Derek Walcott has called the “conversion of the tribe” [“Muse of 
History”]). Thus evangelization itself was one cause of polarization within the 
colonies-the saved versus the unsaved, Christians versus heathens. Secondly, on a 
smaller scale, the Genesis account proved significant in and of itself, as the Empire (like 
the God of the Old Testament who creates a utopic Garden of Eden) tried to “play God” 
and create new Edens of its own within the settler colonies. And, just as the Genesis 
account is predicated upon a system of diametric oppositions (e.g., light versus dark 
[“And God saw the light, that it was good: and God divided the light from the darkness” 
(1:4)]; day versus night [“And God said, Let there be lights in the firmament of the 
heaven to divide the day from the night; and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and
13
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for days, and years” (1:14)]; man versus animal [“And God said, Let us make man in our 
image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion . . . over all the earth” (1:26)]), so 
too is the imperial attempt to create a colony based on a system of underlying 
oppositions: racial/ethnic (black versus white); theological (heathen versus Christian); 
cultural (indigenous versus settler); and political (colony versus metropole). Therefore, if 
one is going to revise the notion of opposition from within a colonial setting, one had best 
start by “writing out o f ’ the originating Genesis text.
Before continuing, it must be noted that I do not mean to suggest that the literary 
revisioning of the seven-day Genesis creation story is a uniquely postcolonial endeavor. 
Indeed, literary works always consist, to a lesser or greater extent, of the works that have 
gone before. Perhaps no other text has been subject to this kind of intertextual re-vision 
than the Bible itself, especially the creation account in Genesis One6. However, what I do 
want to suggest is that, whereas an author like Milton is writing from within a particular 
well-established tradition (that we now identify as the English literary canon), in 
postcolonial writing this tradition is appropriated and re-visioned from the relatively 
uncharted margins of that tradition, at least one remove (i.e., geographically) from the 
center. Thus, postcolonial texts such as Schreiner’s might seem to be written simply from 
the “center” of the European literary tradition (a tradition in which rewritings of biblical 
stories are ubiquitous); yet they are not quite the same as the tradition's, as Schreiner is 
forced to grapple with a different set of questions than did writers like Milton or Blake, 
since she has to confront the “alien” nature of that tradition on African soil. Thus 
Schreiner’s imitation of Genesis is at an immediate “disadvantage,” its project o f mimetic
re-vision seemingly doomed to failure. As mentioned in the Introduction, this “failure” 
manifests itself in the “Times and Seasons” chapter in two ways: in the tenuousness of 
any one-to-one adherence to the Genesis One model; and in the contaminatory presence 
of a dichotomy—justice versus mercy—that is nowhere present in the first chapter of 
Genesis itself.
However, this “failure” need not be cast in a negative light (as it most likely 
would have been in Schreiner’s Victorian era, as discussed below), but can be looked 
upon positively as a move away from the “colonial” model, a movement through (and 
beyond) the original text. This is precisely what Schreiner—subtly, and perhaps even 
unintentionally—assays in the “Times and Seasons” chapter (note the echoes in her 
chapter title of the biblical passage cited above, where day and night serve as “signs to 
mark seasons and days and years”), which attempts to deconstruct binaries like the 
justice/mercy dichotomy via her (albeit imperfect) mimicry of the Genesis creation story. 
This idea of mimicry was an important one in Schreiner’s Victorian (pre-modernist) era, 
during which time the “ideal of mimetic representation” was upheld as the central feature 
of “great” literature (Monsman 48). Thus, a “great” work would strive both to re-present 
a “real” England, and to imitate the works that had come before (Austen, Dickens, Eliot, 
etc.). In the former respect Schreiner was at an immediate disadvantage, as she was 
confined to the colony (she was nearly thirty when she first left South Africa), and was 
denied access to the kind of experiences privileged by the center, those experiences with 
which "literature" was supposedly concerned. Thus Schreiner, to cite The Empire Writes 
Back’s discussion of the unique predicament of the colonial author, was "consigned to a
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world of mimicry and imitation, since [she was] forced to write about material which lies 
at one remove from the significant experiences of the post-colonial world" (Ashcroft 88)7. 
Schreiner's first novel, Undine (published after Story), is one such "failed" colonial 
attempt to write a traditional Victorian novel: set in an England she had never seen, at 
“one remove” (at least!) from her significant experiences, Undine is in large part a 
pastiche that "unfortunately . . .  echoes a host of nineteenth-century novels, from those of 
George Eliot to the then-popular works of Elizabeth Gaskell and Margaret Oliphant" 
(Monsman 38). While Story was, for the most part, well-received in its own day (see 
First and Scott 120-124), much of its negative appraisal in the 1960s and ‘70s was 
likewise based on the assumption that the work is an imperfect imitation of the traditional 
Victorian novel, failing to adhere to such nineteenth-century conventions as linear 
narrative and realistic character portrayal, and jumbling together several narrative modes 
in a style that Joyce Avrech Berkman, in a reappraisal of Schreiner's technique, has called 
an "aesthetics of literary miscegenation" (Berkman 195).8
Yet it is precisely this "failed" mimicry that renders the novel both artistically and 
theoretically significant, for it points to Schreiner's uniquely postcolonial situation: that 
is, the textual failure to create a novel that mimics the "stories" of Empire bespeaks the 
very failure of Empire to create a colony capable of mimicking the culture of the 
metropolitan center9. It is here, when we read Schreiner's unsuccessful textual mimicry as 
a literary re-enactment of the failures of the colonial enterprise, that the biblical creation 
account becomes central. J. M. Goetzee notes that the original colonization of South 
Africa was an abortive attempt to create a new Garden of Eden in the Cape, to "hold the
16
colony to what it had originally been planned as: a trading post, a garden . . . Why did 
[this] garden myth, the myth of a return to Eden and innocence, fail to take root in the 
garden colony of the Cape?” (Coetzee 1-2). Coetzee's answer is straightforward enough: 
"The simplest answer to the question is that Africa could never, in the European 
imagination, be the home of the earthly paradise because Africa was not a new w orld '
(2—my italics). In other words, the colonizer's attempt to inscribe the biblical story upon 
the indigenous culture is always-already positioned for failure, as the European text can 
never fully replace the existing cultural "text," but will merely be superimposed over it in 
palimpsest fashion10. Thus the biblical creation story—indeed, any imperial "story"—can 
only be "misread" by those living in the colony, be they colonizer or colonized.
Schreiner's mimicry of the seven-day creation story in Story, then, is one such inevitable 
"misreading" of the originary biblical text, the effect of which is parodic. In using the 
term "parody" to describe Schreiner’s revision of the creation story I am adopting Linda 
Hutcheon's insightful definition of parody (in her Theory of Parody [1985]) as "not just 
that ridiculing imitation mentioned in the standard dictionary definitions . . .  but imitation 
characterized by ironic inversion . . .  Parody is, in another formulation, repetition with 
critical distance, which marks difference rather than similarity" (Hutcheon 5-6)11. 
Hutcheon points out that parody often functions as a means of coming to terms with the 
past "through ironic recoding" and that parody's "historical consciousness" (that is, its 
self-conscious acknowledgement that it is both referring back to and recoding a prior text) 
gives it the "potential power to both bury the dead, so to speak, and also to give it new 
life" (101). In subsequent articles and books, Hutcheon (herself the product o f a settler
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colony, Canada) would go on to develop this point in the specific context of the 
postcolonial author, whose parodies of Western texts will always, in one way or another, 
function as cleansing—and yet inevitably compromised-—attempts to "write out o f' 
imperial textual/ideological authority. In this sense, Schreiner's parodic revision of the 
creation story is simultaneously a journey into the colonial past (via her mimicry of the 
biblical text, the "vision of the ancient Chaldean") and a movement toward the post- 
colonial future (via her misreading of that vision in an attempt to re-create an Eden that 
"lies in a distant future").12
Whether or not Schreiner's story—The Story of an African Farm—accomplishes 
this movement out of the biblical/colonial stories of the past and into a textual future free 
of the oppositional structures imposed by texts like the Genesis narrative is the driving 
question in my examination of the novel. While I have mentioned some of the 
oppositions laid out in the first and third chapters of Genesis (both of which occupy 
“Times and Seasons”), perhaps the most obvious "oppositional structure" in the Christian 
Bible is its own bipartite division into the Old and New Testaments, a division that the 
two-part structure of Story apparently mimics. Yet this surface reading is too simple, for 
Part One— as we will see—details the contamination and failure of both Old and New 
Testament teachings, ultimately displaying the breakdown of the bipartite biblical 
structure itself. This breakdown is further amplified by the "Times and Seasons" chapter, 
a curious bridge between the two parts that functions as Schreiner's sevenfold attempt to 
"re-create" a religious paradigm that has already broken down in Part One. The seven 
stages in the soul's development outlined in that chapter are loosely parallel to the
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Genesis account of the seven days of creation. However, as I will detail farther in Part 
Two, while the creation story is clearly evoked, the further into the chapter we read the 
more evident it becomes that the one-to-one structural correspondence is barely readable. 
Rather, the creation story becomes for Schreiner a mere framing device within which she 
attempts to eradicate/reconcile the various binary oppositions she reads as posited by the 
Bible (e.g., a just [Old Testament] versus a loving [New Testament] God; human versus 
animal). And, as both the later stages in the soul’s development and the second half of 
the novel reveal, Schreiner is unsuccessful in this attempt. Her inability to work with the 
pre-existing structures of the Bible (i.e, the Old/New Testament structure and the Genesis 
One story) lead to her very imprisonment by those structures: justice and mercy, black 
and white, human and animal remain in diametric opposition to one another. Indeed, the 
second half o f the novel resounds with religious disillusionment and racist overtones.
Schreiner's failure to wrest herself free from the racial stereotypes of her time 
(even as she strove to eliminate sexual stereotypes) was the source of immense conflict in 
her life and writing13. For instance, on the one hand she promoted racial intermixture as 
the means to a more egalitarian society, predicting that a racial "choral symphony" would 
emerge from continued intermarriage (Berkman 118); on the other, she supported 
Darwin's theory of biological reversion (atavism) in interracial breeding (88), and 
continued to use derisive terms like "half-caste" (Schreiner, Thoughts 140), "nigger"
(Diamond Fields 15-16), and "Hottentot" (Thoughts 52). Again, she argued that global 
unity would result "not in the extermination of earth's varied races, or in the dominance of 
anyone over a l l . . .  but in a free and equal federation of all" (296-97); however, when
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asked if she was a "negrophile," Schreiner replied:
No—we are trying to be, but we are not ye t . . .  It would be a lie to say we loved 
the black man . . . [but] we will treat him as if we loved him: and in time . . .  we 
shall perhaps be able to look deep into each other's eyes and smile: as parent and 
child. (361 —my italics)
The simultaneous occupation of two such contradictory positions is basic to Schreiner’s 
perspective—an ambivalence that, as I have argued, is at the heart of postcolonialism.
Finally, then, Schreiner's continued reliance on the idea of oppositional structure, 
both biographically (even her eventual "love" for the African is conceived in hierarchical 
terms) and in her fiction signals the fact that, while she does indeed parody the creation 
text and strive to overthrow its system of binary oppositions, she remains ensconced 
within the very framework her parody tries to undermine and undo. Thus, the second half 
of Story does not attempt to "re-structure" the world according to a non-oppositional 
system, but reflects a world in which the too-rigid (for Schreiner) structures of the Bible 
are present as distant echoes; the patriarchal system of binary oppositions remains present 
to the end. Schreiner's failure to escape colonial/Victorian dualisms in Story may have 
contributed to the fact that she reached an impasse after its publication and was never able 
to complete another novel, spending the remaining years of her life in a state of creative 
frustration, summed up in her lament in an 1899 letter to Havelock Ellis: "I am only a 
broken and untried possibility" (Cronwright-Schreiner, Letters 227).
Schreiner's "failed" literary attempt to escape imperial/patriarchal dichotomies
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raises an issue important not only to her own colonial era, but to our 
postmodem/poststructuralist era as well: how does one move away from the hierarchical 
linguistic constructs of the Eurocentric past? After all, if  Derrida and his ilk have taught 
us anything, it is that the very act of enonciation places the speaker/writer squarely within 
the realm of oppositional hierarchy, as language itself is based upon a system of 
contraries (i.e., the concept of "light" would not exist without its counterpart, "dark") that 
implicitly privileges one term over another (light over dark, white over black, etc.).
Given this a priori condition, any creative attempt to transform the language so that its 
dichotomies become not just inverted but eradicated would seem destined to fail; the task 
of producing a fiction that might somehow purge the biases inherent in language itself 
would appear to be an exercise in futility.
Notwithstanding the difficulty of this enterprise, it is precisely such a task 
that Wilson Harris undertakes in his first novel, Palace of the Peacock, which works 
insistently toward breaking free from the realm of oppositional structure (indeed, from the 
very notion of "structure" itself), "consuming its own biases" (Harris. Womb 26) through 
both a radical re-vision of conventional language use and, as Schreiner assayed in Story, a 
parodic "misreading" of the Genesis story. In Palace this parody begins with "The Second 
Death,"14 the third of its four books (as in Story, the novel’s halfway point serving as the 
point of departure for the story of beginnings), when the plantation owner Donne and his 
multiracial river crew commence a seven-day journey upriver into the Guyanese interior 
as they pursue the aboriginal "folk" who have fled Donne's harsh rule. Most critics agree 
that the "allotted seven" days (Palace 76) allude to the seven-day creation story in
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Genesis* and they almost without exception read the two texts as parallel.15 While this 
type of reading is an important step toward understanding Harris' work in terms of its 
biblical intertext, I would take the argument one step further to contend that, given 
Harris's Caribbean context, and his own theoretical/creative project, the seven-day river 
journey in Palace can only be read as a reverse parallel movement through the Genesis 
account in an attempt (like Schreiner's) to "write out o f' this particular imperial story, to 
"strip and subtilize" the "original veil of creation" fSecret Ladder 417) outlined in the 
Bible.16 In calling the biblical creation story a "veil" Harris implies that it hides or 
obscures what lies behind—here, among other things, the pre-colonial "text" of 
indigenous Caribbean culture (a notion similar to the "palimpsest" effect described 
above). The seven-day structure of the last half of Palace functions as the "stripping" 
away of this veil, the first day of the journey being analogous to the seventh "day of rest" 
in the Bible, the second to the sixth, and so forth, continuing until this one-to-one 
(reverse) mimicry falls apart on the fifth (third) day, with the final two days of the voyage 
running together with no clear structure as guide. Finally, the crew reaches a primordial, 
pre-Edenic state in which the oppositional biases inherent in Genesis (e.g. light/dark, 
heavens/earth) have been eroded and replaced by the protean, apocalyptic image of the 
"palace of the peacock" itself (a "symbol of totality" that "unitefs] the disparate elements 
o f creation" [Maes-Jelinek, Naked Design 54]). Thus Harris more nearly approaches a 
"re-creation" of his textual universe than does Schreiner, a re-creation that may well mark 
the passage from a colonial to a post(-)colonial world.
Why is Harris able so radically to re-vision the biblical creation story while
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Schreiner remains fixed in its inherent system of oppositions? There are a number of 
possible reasons, a few of which it will be helpful to expound upon here before taking a 
closer look at The Story of an African Farm. As Schreiner's concern with the creation 
story is inextricably linked to her identity as a South African writer living in a racially 
divided society of natives and settlers, so too is Harris's reverse movement through the 
Genesis text—the European text of origin-—directly tied to his identity as a Caribbean 
writer, for "one of the most clearly and frequently seen regularities of the Caribbean novel 
is its reiteration of the theme that has come to be known as 'the search for identity' or 'the 
search for roots'" (Benitez-Rojo 186). The ubiquitous Caribbean literary quest to recover 
origins— origins that will "authorize a beginning" (Bhabha 96)—is catalyzed by the fact 
that the original West Indian colonial enterprise was responsible for literally stripping 
both the natives and the imported slaves of their historical identities. Within a century of 
their invasion, the European colonizers virtually annihilated the indigenous Caribs and 
Arawaks (Ashcroft 26); uprooted Africans from their homeland and shipped them to the 
Caribbean as slaves (where oftentimes they were separated from other members of their 
language groups and forced to speak in the language of the plantation owners [27]); and, 
in the nineteenth century, imported Indian and Chinese natives to the West Indies as 
"indentured labourers," only to leave them stranded in the Caribbean when return clauses 
in indenture contracts were not honored (146). Thus deprived of their cultural origins, the 
colonized peoples were to a great extent forced to "[live] in a borrowed culture" (Naipaul 
68) and to accept the biblical story of origin—the creation story— as their own. As 
subsequent generations passed, the original identities and tales o f origin of each culture-
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core faded as "black” and "white" races began to mix, creating what has today become an 
increasingly "creolized" Caribbean culture—a condition that some West Indian writers 
"see as the chaos, others as the open possibilities of their society" (Ramchand 4).
How is creolization—an inevitable result of the injustices of European 
colonization—the source of "open possibilities" in West Indian society? It is indeed one 
of the great ironies of Caribbean literature that the confluence of races (cultural 
metissage) has become for most Caribbean writers a potential means of escape from the 
imperial authority of the past, which fomented (and also anathematized) racial 
hybridization itself. For creolization by nature involves the erosion of the dichotomies 
(between black and white, master and slave) that the imperial project instituted and 
perpetuated. Thus, creolization opens the door to a "new" perception of the West Indian 
situation: as the Barbadian poet and critic Edward Kamau Brathwaite defines it, 
creolization is "a way of seeing [Caribbean] society, not in terms of white and black, 
master and slave, in separate nuclear units, but as contributory parts of a whole" 
(Brathwaite, Development 307). Despite the anti-essentialist vision his concept of 
hybridity affords (which more and more postcolonial critics are recognizing as the 
"necessary precondition of the future emergence, at the local level, of healthy Caribbean 
societies and, at the global level, of a functional world order" [Bongie 54]), Brathwaite 
also proposes that an (ab)original essence exists at the core of each racial group that 
remains distinct even when racial groups have mixed. To recover his/her originating 
"essence," or "nam," the artist must make a "journey into the past and hinterland which is 
at the same time a movement of possession into present and future" (Brathwaite,
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"Timehri" 42).17
This "journey into the past," which is concomitantly a "movement into the future," 
is in many respects the essence of Harris's fictional project. If "history is a fiction," as 
Harris himself states (quoted in Fabre 42), then its "facts" are actually mere 
"perceptions"—a recognition that allows the poet/artist to re-vision the Caribbean past, 
re-animate the antagonistic images infecting its history, and view them from a radically 
different perspective. This is precisely the movement of Palace, as the river crew's 
journey into the past (backward through Genesis) carries them to a visionary future free 
o f the kinds of polarizations the biblical Genesis narrative institutes. While critics have 
often stressed the incompatibility of Brathwaite's and Harris's approaches to the 
quest(ion) o f origins,18 one should not overlook their shared belief that a new age of 
racial/cultural harmony will emerge only through a backward journey that will catalyze 
the kind of breakdown of oppositions exemplified by creolization. Like Brathwaite,
Harris is primarily concerned with the eradication of oppositions inherent in the colonial 
discourses of the past, seeing "in the very dissolution of monolithic world structures 
(including, of course, the dissolution of empire) an opportunity for the renascence of a 
more 'balanced' civilization" (Maes-Jelinek, "Unfinished Genesis" 237).
How will this "dissolution" begin? Harris proposes that the union of the disparate 
elements in any given dichotomy will effect their eventual "consumption"; however, this 
will require the sacrifice of dualistic cognition, those "embedded and cherished habits of 
thought and feeling perpetuated by frozen tradition" (Adler 37-38). In this sense Harris's 
vision accords with that of William Blake (to whom he is often compared), who imagined
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that the wedding of contraries would bring about the apocalypse and institute the 
millennium, the thousand-year reign of the kingdom of God on earth.19 Harris, who uses 
a line from a Blake letter as one of Palace’s epigraphs (“It ceases to be history and 
becomes [. . .] fabricated for pleasure, as modems say, but I say by Inspiration”), also 
feels that we live in what could be a "gateway age," that if the "doors of perception were 
cleansed" (Blake 73)— if people "could read themselves in a different way and read the 
world around them in a different way" (Gilkes, "Landscape" 38)—we would move 
through the present age to "an era never before conceived of by man" (Adler 37). Indeed, 
Harris holds out as a "dazzling and almost tangible possibility a new creation of the world 
and man by man himself' (40).
At this point, one may well ask how, practically speaking, Harris believes the 
world will be thus transformed. Certainly the divine task of re-creating the universe so 
that its defining dichotomies are conjoined and thereby consumed is beyond the scope of 
any literary endeavour. Yet Harris believes the artistic imagination is capable o f pre­
figuring such a radical change via the production of (what I here term) a "creolized 
fiction," which symbiotically combines words and/or ideas that would traditionally be 
considered "opposites." As Gilkes points out, "because he refuses to consider concepts 
like 'strong' and 'weak,' 'good' and 'evil,' or even 'actual' and 'fictitious' as self-evident 
absolutes or diametrically opposed definitions, Harris's universe . . .  is composed of 
contraries" (Gilkes, Wilson Harris 3). Thus, Harris's fiction abounds with seeming 
paradoxes, such as "I awoke with one dead seeing eye and one living closed eye" /Palace 
19), "falling motionlessly" (100), and "he saw the invisible otherness around" (108—my
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italics). The narrator of Palace himself concludes that harmony is achieved only through 
the commingling of opposites:
I had understood that no living ear on earth can truly understand the fortune of 
love and the art of victory over death without mixing blind joy and sadness and 
. the sense of being lost with the nearness of being found. (114)
How can one speak of oneself as being both lost and found at one and the same time?
This is the quest(ion) that Harris poses to his reader.
Harris's unique vision—that the eradication of oppositional thinking will result 
from the transformation (creolization) of oppositional language— is what ultimately 
distinguishes his work and thought from that of a late-Victorian writer like Schreiner, 
who "could formulate no convincing alternatives to the existing colonial order" (Gorak 
71), an order based upon binary conceptions. Confronted with this vision, the unwary 
reader might be tempted to identify it as that of a quintessentially "postmodernist" or 
"poststructuralist" writer/theoretician—that is, as that of someone whose fictional method 
suggests that words are not inseparably linked to their "meanings," thus demonstrating the 
"convertibility of language" [Maes-Jelinek, “Forward” 10]). However, Harris, as is only 
fitting, resists even this kind of categorization. For him, the universe of games to which 
art is relegated once signifier and signified are ripped apart is abhorrent:
Art is not a game. It's not the nihilist post-modernist game. I would never go 
along with post-modernism because, whatever theoretical value it has, art really 
becomes a game. I have no theories in that sense . . . one [can] have a religious
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hope. That may seem a strange assertion, that one could have a religious hope.
(quoted in Riach 59)
It is this religious sense that, ultimately, sets Harris apart from the post-Nietzschean world 
of skeptical thought with which his narratives often seem to overlap.
Attending to this religious sense also provides the final grounds for my reading of 
Palace as a parody of the biblical creation story. Michael Jagessar has brilliantly argued 
that "a crucial question for theology in the Caribbean relates to discovering metaphors 
and symbols through which God can be conceived as the Thou who is related to the world 
in an interdependent way," as opposed to the concept of God as an outsider, over and 
above the people. This revision of the conception of God must commence, Jagessar 
continues, with a radical revision of the language, "a revision which must begin at the 
level o f the imagination. Consequently, there is a need to deconstruct and reconstruct the 
traditional metaphors and symbols of the Christian faith" (Jagessar 224). Palace, as I 
have suggested, accomplishes this revision by "deconstructing" the Genesis story and 
"reconstructing" it through the elimination of its system of oppositions; the creation 
account is exposed as a "blind dream" and thereby "crumbles as it is re-enacted." Couple 
this theological position with the fact that Harris's creative project is remarkably similar 
to that of Christianity (to literally "establish the Kingdom of God on earth" through the 
creative imagination [Riach 54]), and it indeed seems strange that, as Mark Williams and 
Alan Riach note, "there has been an embarrassed silence about the religious aspects of 
[Harris's] writing" (Riach 50).
Before we proceed to Part Two, however, it must be noted that I do not mean to
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suggest that Harris himself is a "Christian" in any traditional sense of the word;20 nor do I 
mean to argue that Harris draws solely upon biblical imagery in Palace. Indeed, the 
seven-day river journey may be read in any one of many contexts (fittingly, given its 
creolized nature). Hena Maes-Jelinek, Sandra Drake, and Antonio Benitez-Rojo have 
thoroughly treated Harris’s evocation of the quest for the mythic El Dorado, the 
"quintessential myth of the post-Columbian Caribbean" (Drake 5);21 Michael Gilkes 
offers a brilliant reading of the seven-day river journey as the seven stages of the 
alchemical process (Gilkes, Wilson Harris 36-40); and Drake has discussed the various 
images from Amerindian and African folk lore at work in Palace as well as numerous 
references to Eastern religious ideas and symbols (Drake 49-70). Certainly one could 
read this commingling of Western and non-Western religious and mythic images in 
Palace as another way in which Harris "creolizes" his fiction.
Finally, when addressing Harris's fiction it is imperative to recognize that his 
aesthetic program is ultimately a field of experiment in which nothing is ever final or 
complete. To say that Harris has "achieved" anything in his fiction—that he has 
"successfully" overcome the language of dichotomies—would be once again to fall into 
the trap of binary discourse, as "success" implies its opposite. Harris has called fiction 
writing an "infinite rehearsal," a continual practicing and refining of technique for a 
"production" that, paradoxically, the players know will never materialize. The critic must 
"finally" conclude that nothing in Harris is final; in Palace, inasmuch as Harris succeeds 
in de- and re-creating the biblical creation story, we must inevitably read it—and the rest 
of his oeuvre—as an "unfinished Genesis" (Harris, Four Banks 9).
PART TWO: “AN ENDING IN NOTHING”
And it was all play, and no one could tell what it had lived and worked for. A striving,
and a striving, and an ending in nothing.
Olive Schreiner, Story of an African Farm
Harris’s concept of an “unfinished Genesis,” a positive envisioning of a never 
completed creative project, recalls and echoes Schreiner’s earlier lament that, at the end 
o f her life and oeuvre, she was “only a broken and untried possibility” (Cronwright- 
Schreiner, Letters 227). Had Schreiner been able to embrace this condition as creative (as 
did Harris) rather than lament it (one thinks of Beckett’s paradoxically optimistic 
admonition to “fail better”), perhaps her fiction, like that of Harris, would have come 
closer to escaping the kind of dualistic ideology from which she so longed to be free. 
However, in even attempting to purge the biases inherent in her culture and language, 
Olive Schreiner was well before her time. As mentioned above, much of the negative 
appraisal of Story of an African Farm has stemmed from the fact that critics have 
examined it in the light o f other late-nineteenth-century, Victorian novels. It is time to 
view Schreiner’s Story through a new postcolonial critical lens.
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* * *
In what is still very much a standard study on the general character of the 
Victorian age, The Victorian Frame of Mind 11830-18701 Walter Houghton describes the 
almost alarming exultation with which many Victorians cast off their Christian faith in 
favor o f science:
The new vision of a ‘scientific’ universe was a nightmare—and it was a glorious 
dream, as men discovered that much or all of dogmatic Christianity was sheer 
superstition, thank God, and looked forward, with joyful anticipation in some 
cases, to a new revelation of man’s destiny. To put the situation another way, if 
modernism for most Victorians threatened to destroy the comforts of belief, for a 
substantial minority it promised to end the ^co m fo rts  of belief. (Houghton 48)
Houghton goes on to delineate two specific discomforts the shedding of faith “relieved” 
for the Victorian thinker: the intellectual and emotional burdens the Christian faith 
placed on the believer. Intellectually, he says, it was difficult, if  not impossible, for many 
Victorians to accept the “miraculous character of Christian theology: the story of creation 
in Genesis, the incarnation, the virgin birth . . .  A liberal effort to free the mind from 
these ‘Hebrew old clothes’ seemed to many thinkers the major need of the age” (48-49). 
Further, the emotional fear of damnation, the inability to reconcile the “conception of a 
jealous God of wrath, punishing most of the human race with eternal torture in hell” (51) 
with a God of love, the Calvinist idea of human nature, “innately corrupt and powerless to 
attain salvation except by an act of divine grace,” and the corresponding “anxious self-
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examination in a frantic effort to determine whether one was among the elect or the 
damned” (51) all led to the formation of a context of “living fear from which any escape, 
even at the cost of all religious faith, might seem at times a blessed event” (51).
It is indeed indicative of Schreiner’s Victorian “frame of mind” that, despite her 
foreign location, it is precisely these two “discomforts”—the intellectual and the 
emotional—that inform and direct her structural revisions of Genesis in the middle space 
o f Storv. the “Times and Seasons” chapter. On the one hand, her “failed” revision of 
Genesis One (which ultimately rejects God for science/Nature itself) speaks to the 
intellectual credulity she felt must accompany belief in such “miraculous” bibl ical 
accounts; on the other, the presence of the seeming dichotomy between God’s wrath and 
love in “Times and Seasons” (and her eventual abandonment of either conception of God 
in favor o f Nature) speaks to the emotional fears instilled by her rearing and instruction in 
her mother’s Calvinist faith. Further, her very inclusion of the idea of God’s wrath (in the 
Bible, a result of Adam’s sin in Genesis Three) in an allegory that is ostensibly concerned 
with the first chapter of Genesis points to the novel’s postcolonial condition: “new 
beginnings” (like a colony) will always be “contaminated” by what has gone before, by 
what has already begun (in a colony, the pre-existing indigenous and colonial cultures 
“get in the way” of an absolute beginning; in “Times and Seasons,” the entirety o f 
scripture and its teachings on justice/mercy “gets in the way” of Schreiner’s attempt to 
write a new beginning).
Indeed, questionings that derive from both the intellectual and emotional modes of 
discomfort surface from the outset o f the novel. Before entering into a detailed
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discussion, however, some background to the novel and its plot and characters will be 
helpful. The Storv of an African Farm, published in 1883 by Chapman and Hall after it 
was recommended by their reader, George Meredith, is set in pre-industrial South Africa 
(circa 1858-1867). Most of the narrative takes place on the African farm, with its cast of 
characters functioning as a “microcosm of the polyglot culture of South Africa” 
(Monsman 49). The central characters on the farm represent the confluence of various 
races/nationalities: Old Otto, the simple-minded German overseer, is father to the dark, 
brooding Waldo, the tragic hero of the novel (who in many ways recalls Emily Bronte’s 
Heathcliff). Tant Sannie, the “boorish” Boer (Dutch) owner of the farm, and Bonaparte 
Blenkins, the Irish charlatan who attempts to seduce her in order to steal the farm, serve 
as comic foils to the rest of the characters. Tant Sannie’s English stepdaughter, Em 
(whose father owned the farm before his death), is cousin to Lyndall, the tragic feminist 
heroine whose denunciation of traditional sex roles and male domination has led critics to 
class her as one of the earliest sympathetic portrayals of the “New Woman” (48).
Another significant character (though he resists classification as either tragic or comic) is 
Gregory Rose, who surfaces in Part Two as Lyndall’s would-be lover, but who eventually 
gets in touch with his decidedly feminine nature by cross-dressing as a nurse in order to 
be close to the dying heroine. And, never far in the background, a host of subservient 
“Kaffirs” and “Hottentots” appear, completing the picture of the primary social units in 
mid-nineteenth-century South Africa.
The bipartite novel tells primarily two stories: Waldo’s story in Part One, 
Lyndall’s story in Part Two (although we continue to glimpse Waldo throughout Part
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Two, as we get glimpses of Lyndall throughout Part One). Waldo and Lyndall serve, 
respectively, as the narrative mouthpieces through which Schreiner voices her religious 
and feminist concerns: thus, Part One details Waldo’s spiritual crisis of belief in, and 
eventual disgust and disillusionment with, the religious beliefs of his father Otto; Part 
Two traces Lyndall’s contempt for patriarchal society and assertion of her own sexual 
liberation. At first glance, the novel’s bipartite division seems to suggest a textual 
parallel to the Old/New Testament structure of the Bible. Indeed, the opening pages of 
the novel immediately evoke (what the novel will continually depict as) the Old 
Testament God of wrath, as Waldo lies awake, listening to the inexorable ticking of his 
father’s watch and pondering the irrevocable, unchangeable will of God in sending 
countless souls into the pit of hell:
The boy lay with his eyes wide open. He saw before him a long stream of people, 
a great dark multitude, that moved in one direction; then they came to the dark 
edge of the world, and went over . . . And all the while the watch kept ticking on; 
just like God’s will, that never changes or alters, you may do what you please. 
(Story 37)
Moreover, the farm in Part One—ruled by the domineering hand of Bonaparte Bienkins, a 
vagabond who arrives on the farm in Chapter Three and proceeds, through lies and 
deception (taking advantage of Tant Sannie’s and Otto’s ignorance and credulity), to 
usurp Otto’s place as overseer and become schoolmaster to the girls—also ignites images 
of Old Testament Israel, where the Letter of the Law ruled, often to the exclusion of 
mercy. By contrast, the farm in Part Two, in which Bonaparte has been expelled from the
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farm (after Tant Sannie catches him seducing her niece) and the gentler and more 
feminine hands of Tant Sannie, Em, and the cross-dressing Gregory Rose have taken 
charge of it, ostensibly recalls the New Testament world where the old Jewish patriarch 
has been displaced and an (ultimately illusory) freedom and equality reigns—a “freedom” 
that might lure one into believing, as it were, that on the farm “There is neither Jew nor 
Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Galatians 
3:28).
Yet this surface reading, on closer examination, quickly falls apart, as Part One 
displays a contaminatory mixing together of both Old and New Testament 
stories/perspectives—their “miscegenation,” to “use the pejorative term; or, their 
“creolization,” to speak from the more positive perspective of someone like Harris. 
Despite this mixing of Old and New Testament-stories, however, at the end of Part One 
the figures of Old (divine justice) and New (divine mercy) Testaments remain in binary 
opposition to one another in the characters of Bienkins and Otto, as discussed below 
(thereby necessitating a new Genesis, which materializes in “Times and Seasons”).
We first see this commingling (and thus effective dismantling) of Old and New 
Testaments in the subsection of the novel’s first chapter entitled “The Sacrifice,” where 
Waldo conflates Old and New Testament prayers as he offers a mutton chop before the 
Lord on a rough-hewn altar of twelve stones (a number that evokes the twelve tribes of 
Israel). He calls out and asks God, like the Old Testament Elijah before the prophets of 
Baal (see 1 Kings 18:16-40), to “send fire down from heaven to bum it” (Storv 40), 
although where Elijah offers a bull Waldo can only supply a mutton chop— a good
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example o f the “inferiority” of colonial mimesis (from one perspective) or (from another) 
its parodicity. Waldo then continues, “Thou hast said, Whosoever shall say unto this 
mountain, Be thou cast into the sea, nothing doubting, it shall be done” (40). This recalls 
Christ’s words in Matthew 17:20, “if you have faith as small as a mustard seed, you can 
say to this mountain, ‘Move from here to there’ and it will move.”22
However, unlike the God of the Old Testament who does indeed send fire down 
from heaven to consume the offering, Waldo’s God remains silent, and Waldo, after 
waiting till sunset and watching the mutton chop merely melt over the stones in the heat, 
“broke down the altar, and threw the meat far, far away into the field” (41). He 
concludes, in an ironic recoding of the account of Elijah (where Elijah and the Baal 
worshippers finally affirm the existence and sovereignty of God: “The Lord-he is God!” 
[1 Kings 18:39]), “I am like Cain-I am not His. He will not hear my prayer. God hates 
me” (41). Thus, Schreiner mixes the Old Testament story of Elijah’s faith with the New 
Testament Christological teaching on faith, and ends up with a parodic outcome: Waldo, 
who like Elijah affirms God’s existence and sovereignty, pictures himself as being 
outside of God’s love; in Calvinistic terms, he sees himself as being one of the damned. 
Schreiner’s conflation of Old and New Testament texts here thus has the effect of 
introducing the very dichotomy between God’s love and his wrath that is central to the 
novel.
This dichotomy is again evoked on the page following the mutton chop non­
miracle, where Waldo confesses (in yet another Old Testament/New Testament 
commingling): “I love Jesus Christ, but I hate God” (42). But this privileging of one
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conception of God (the Son who offers mercy) over another (the Father who demands 
justice) is fraught with irony, if only because the New Testament teaches in no uncertain 
terms that Jesus Christ is God,The familiar concept of the Incarnation (cf. John 1:1: “In 
the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God”). 
Waldo’s “confession” that he loves Christ (mercy) but hates God (judgement) relies on a 
binary opposition, an either/or, that the biblical doctrine of Christ’s propitiation undoes 
(see my Conclusion). This “confession” (“I hate God”) also points to the arrival of the 
hated Bonaparte Bienkins, who is Waldo’s Old Testament God personified, and the 
Irishman’s juxtaposition with Waldo’s real father Otto, who represents the Jesus Christ 
whom Waldo “loves.” Thus, Bonaparte Bienkins and Otto represent the Old and New 
Testaments, judging God versus merciful Christ, respectively—an ironic reversal of 
biblical “order,” inasmuch as Bonaparte is a new, intrusive presence on the farm who 
displaces its old caretaker.
Gerald Monsman has noted that the figure of Bienkins is a “mythic/parodic 
representation of patriarchal power” (Monsman 61), as indeed he is: overseer, 
schoolmaster, preacher of death and damnation. During his Sunday sermon he relates the 
ridiculous tale of how he climbed to the top of a seething volcano, Mt. Etna, and peered 
down inside to witness the churning skeleton of a man who committed suicide over a lost 
love upon a “lake of fire and brimstone” (Storv 71). He tells this obvious lie in the midst 
of preaching a sermon on the topic, “All liars shall have their part in the lake which 
bumeth with fire and brimstone, which is the second death” (70). Besides the obvious 
irony (he lies to illustrate his point), we note the lack of any New Testament rhetoric of
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forgiveness for sins; Bonaparte is firmly ensconced within (what is viewed as) an Old 
Testament rhetoric of adherence to the letter of the law, and within a vision of the world 
that sees in the “second death” (ironically, a New Testament idea [cf. Revelation 20:14]) 
a definitive ending, rather than the opportunity for a new beginning with which, as we 
have seen, Harris associates it.
Bonaparte is further linked to the Old Testament God in the Garden of Eden when 
he questions Waldo about the young man’s frequent visits to the loft. After Otto’s death 
(Tant Sannie sends Otto away because she believes the lies Bienkins tells about him, but 
just before he is to leave Otto dies peacefully-and somewhat pathetically-in his sleep), 
Waldo discovers a set of books in the loft that once belonged to Em’s father. Bienkins, 
who after Otto’s demise assumes the role of father to Waldo, decides that, since there is 
•neither alcohol nor a woman up in the loft, Waldo must be eating Tant Sannie’s dried 
peaches (even though Tant Sannie muses, “He must have been a great fool to eat my 
peaches . . . they are full of mites as a sheepskin, and as hard as stones” [121]). In a 
confrontation that alludes to God’s confrontation with Adam in the Garden after he had 
eaten o f the fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge o f Good and Evil (but note the ironic 
displacement from fresh fruit to dried), Bonaparte demands, “Waldo, answer me . . .  have 
you, or have you not, did you, or did you not, eat of the peaches in the loft?” (122). He 
then announces Waldo’s punishment by confinement: “It will enable you, Waldo, to 
reflect on the enormity o f the sin you have committed against our Father in heaven” 
(123), again linking the episode to Adam’s Fall. Here, as Monsman points out,
“Bienkins’s fatherhood and God’s are inseparable-fraudulent and tyrannical” (Monsman
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63).
Bienkins is again portrayed as a merciless, judging “father” when he beats Waldo 
for “stealing” the peaches: “‘Chasten thy son while there is hope,’” he says before casting 
the first blow, “‘and let not thy soul spare for his crying.’ Those are God’s words. I shall 
act as a father to you, Waldo” (124). Obviously, this “act” does not succeed; Bonaparte’s 
hypocrisy is soon exposed when Tant Sannie, whom Bonaparte has been courting, 
witnesses him seducing her young niece Trana and pours a barrel of pickled mutton chops 
onto his head at the climax of his passionate lovemaking (a rather more effective use of 
mutton chops than Waldo’s, one might note!). Bonaparte is thus mercifully sent away, 
with the ironic last words spoken to Waldo, “May the blessing of my God and m y fa th er’s 
God rest on you, now and evermore” (133-my italics).
Bonaparte’s final words call to mind Waldo’s earthly father, Otto, who is set in 
diametrical opposition to Bienkins and embodies the grace and mercy of the New 
Testament Jesus Christ. Otto is perpetually “turning the other cheek,” doing good unto 
his enemies (e.g., giving his Sunday suit and  sermon to Bienkins), and living as a “Good 
Samaritan.” The obvious allusion to this parable (Luke 10:30-37) occurs when Otto finds 
the wife of the Kaffir herdsman (who has been “turned out” because twenty sheep are 
discovered missing; we later learn that Bienkins was responsible) lying next to a milk- 
bush with her infant tied to her back. After ascertaining that the Kaffir woman had been 
“turned away” unjustly, he returns with food and gives her his “old brown salt-and-pepper 
coat” (88). Otto is here equated with the Samaritan in Christ’s parable, who is deemed a 
“neighbor” to the battered stranger (left for dead along the side of the road from
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Jerusalem to Jericho) because he “shewed mercy on him” (Luke 10:37). Even when Tant 
Sannie sends Otto away due to Bonaparte’s lies, the old man neither resists nor places 
blame; he merely composes a pathetically optimistic letter to Lyndall and Em, exhorting 
them to “serve the Saviour; give your hearts to Him while you are yet young. Life is 
short” (94).
Yet, for all his goodness and innocence, Otto—the parodic embodiment of New 
Testament Christological mercy—is a senescent fool. He is naive in his charity; it never 
occurs to him that the Kaffir woman to whom he gives his cloak “would creep back to the 
huts at the homestead when the darkness favoured her” (88). He is blind to Blenkins’s 
duplicitous nature; indeed, he takes Christ’s teaching that “inasmuch as ye have done it 
unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me“ (Matthew 25:40) to 
the literal extreme as he gazes upon Blenkins’s sleeping form: “He [Otto] saw not the 
bloated body nor the evil face of the man; but, as it were, under deep disguise and fleshly 
concealment, the form that long years of dreaming had made very real to him. ‘Jesus, 
lover . . .  to serve Thee, to take Thee in!”’ (57). Significantly, it is “dreaming” that makes 
Christ real to him, and not fact; Otto is unable to dissociate the dream and the reality. 
Indeed, for him there may be no difference between the two, between a story and a fact: 
when Lyndall asks him how he knows the stories Bienkins tells are true, his ire is aroused 
and he cries out, “‘That is what I do hate! . . . Know that is true! How do you know that 
anything is true? Because you are told so . . . How do you know that God talked to 
Moses, except that Moses wrote it?” (62). Finally, he takes his “turn the other cheek” 
credo too far when Tant Sannie exiles him from the farm; as he prepares to leave all his
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possessions save one small bundle “he never thought of entering a protest against the loss 
of his goods: like a child he submitted, and wept” (94). Rachel Blau Duplessis has 
observed that, through the parodic Christ-figure of Otto, Schreiner “exploits the literal 
perversity of such extreme faith” and “propounds the blasphemous notion that to live 
uncritically according to the literal Christian story is to put the devil in power” (Blau 
Duplessis 22). If, as Christ tells his disciples when he “sends them out like sheep among 
the wolves,” Christians are to be “as shrewd as snakes and as innocent as doves” 
(Matthew 10:16), Otto falls pathetically short on the former count.
Thus, at the end of Part One Waldo (and, by extension, the reader) is left in a 
world where both the (parodic versions of the) Old and New Testament Gods have been 
displaced: the former expelled from the Garden himself, the latter dead, never to rise 
again. At the end of Part One Waldo no'longer hates God, but quite simply denies his 
existence: ‘“ There is no God!’ he almost hissed; ‘no God; not anywhere!’” (102). After 
being exposed to all this negation in Part One, the reader could hardly be surprised by the 
tone of the epigraph that opens Part Two, but might well be in a better position to decode 
its relevance to the Bible: “And it was all play, and no one could tell what it had lived 
and worked for. A striving [Blenkins/Old Testament justice], and a striving [Otto/New 
Testament mercy], and an ending in nothing” (135-my brackets).
The useless striving of the various fathers and sons in Part One makes room, in 
Part Two, for a narrative centered around Lyndall; feminist critics have picked up on this 
aspect of the novel and its attempt (in Blau Duplessis’s words) to go “beyond the ending” 
of conventional patriarchal scripts to which nineteenth-century women writers were
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condemned. But I will be focusing on the novel’s structural center, the anomalous 
chapter “Times and Seasons,” an ambivalent middle passage between its two gendered 
parts that depicts, in seven separate stages, the spiritual and intellectual growth of a 
child’s mind from infancy through childhood. In the seven sections of this chapter, 
Schreiner attempts to “re-create” religious belief;.it is her own “Genesis” of sorts. This 
“beginning,” coming at the halfway point of the novel, suggests the colonial condition 
itself, as colonial cultures (which conceive of themselves, as I have argued, as Genesis­
like experiments in the creation of new worlds, just as Schreiner’s chapter is an 
experiment in the creation of a new religious order) always begin in the middle. While 
attempting to be “new,” they actually interrupt an existing narrative and extend another 
narrative (itself already “old”) over top of it. In this sense, as I have argued, the colonial 
culture/text will always-already contain elements of the postcolonial, as will be evidenced 
by the failure of Schreiner’s allegorization of Genesis One to conform to (or entirely 
escape) its original model.
Perhaps it is only fitting, then, to begin discussing the “Times and Seasons” 
chapter in its own middle with Schreiner’s depiction of a (failed) allegorical reading of 
the Bible. In stage four of the seven-part narrative, the child (who remains nameless, 
although most critics agree that he is most likely Waldo himself), assailed by religious 
doubt, “yeam[s] for a token from the inexorably silent one” (Storv 142). He grabs the 
Bible, puts his finger down on a page, and bends to read, confident that what he will 
encounter is the very voice of God speaking directly to his heart. With bated breath the 
child looks down and reads, “‘Then fourteen years after I went up again to Jerusalem with
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Barnabas, and took Titus with me also”’ (143). The child’s imagination “seizes it for a 
moment: we are twisting, twirling, trying to make an allegory” (143). But a sudden 
loathing comes to him as he realizes the futility of his efforts; “we seize the book, swing 
it round our head, and fling it with all our might to the farther end of the room. We put 
down our head again and weep” (143).
The child’s failed attempt to make an allegory out of a biblical passage that resists 
allegorization, which on the literal level simply pictures Waldo’s acute religious strife, is 
almost eerily self-reflexive as it images failed allegorical reading within a “failed” 
allegorical reading. As I have begun to argue, the seven-stage allegory is structurally 
disordered (and thus “fails”) in two ways: its seven days are “out of order,” initially 
offering only a very loose parallel with, and eventually failing to parallel at all, the seven 
days o f creation outlined in Genesis One; and the dichotomy between divine justice and 
mercy raised in the chapter is “out of order” as these ideas are not a part o f Genesis One 
but are first raised later, in Genesis Three, where God’s wrath manifests itself only after 
Adam and Eve succumb to the serpent’s wiles and, contrary to God’s will, eat the fruit 
from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil.
The very chapter title, “Times and Seasons,” is itself “out of order” as it hearkens 
to yet another passage of scripture that comes after Genesis in the Old Testament, the oft- 
quoted verse in the book of Ecclesiastes, “To every thing there is a season, and a time to 
every purpose under the heaven” (Eccl. 3:1). This statement comes at the end of King 
Solomon’s (the psuedonymous author) reflection on the vanity of all things, a two-chapter 
re visitation of his life’s work, in which he determines that the strivings of his entire life
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have been in vain: “Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher, vanity of vanities; all is vanity” 
(Eccl. 1:2). Thus the chapter (in which we expect to “begin anew”) in effect begins 
at/with the end, which ironically situates (indeed, contaminates) the seven-stage narrative 
that follows.
Schreiner now engages in a depiction of these seven stages of the psyche’s 
development, which she likens to times and seasons: “The soul’s life has seasons of its 
own; periods not found in any calendar, times that years and months will not scan” (137). 
Recalling the allusion to Ecclesiastes, in which the “times and seasons” of life have been 
pronounced “vanity of vanities,” we begin to get a sense of the direction the seven stages 
will take. The first stage (infancy) seems, at first, loosely to parallel the first day of 
creation in Genesis, upon which God creates light: “And God said, Let there be light: and 
there was light. And God saw the light, that it was good: and God divided the light from 
the darkness. And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night” (Gen. 1:3- 
5a)23. Similarly, the infant in stage one is separating light from darkness: “from the 
shadowy background of forgetfulness start out pictures of startling clearness, 
disconnected, but brightly colored, and indelibly printed in the mind” (Storv 137). Note, 
however, that the infant in this stage is not acting (as is God in the Genesis narrative) but 
is a passive participant in the process. “Light” and “dark” binaries abound as various 
pictures from the natural world start out and become permanently, “startlingly,” 
impressed upon the infant’s mind (in an almost Wordsworthian, “spots of time” fashion), 
like the “warm summer’s evening” when “we have yet the taste of bread and milk in our 
mouth, and the red sunset is reflected in our basin” (137); or the “dark night” when the
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child wakes with the “fear that there is some great being in the room” (137). Schreiner 
even invokes the image of the rainbow (the visible manifestation of light itself) in this 
stage, saying it is the picture that “starts out more vividly than any” (138). However, here 
the narrative again departs structurally from its model, as the image of light is already 
“contaminated” by the image of the rainbow, which is not introduced in the Bible until 
Genesis Nine. Moreover, the rainbow is a sign of the covenant God makes with Noah 
and “every living creature that is with you, for perpetual generations” (9:12) that “neither 
shall all flesh be cut off any more by the waters of a flood; neither shall there any more be 
a flood to destroy the earth” (9:11). The image of the rainbow thus necessarily conjures 
up the dichotomy between God’s wrath (i.e., he destroyed the world because of the 
proliferation of wickedness [cf. Gen. 6:5-6]) and his mercy (i.e., he promises to never 
destroy the earth in this manner again).
This dichotomy begins to manifest itself more and more clearly in the subsequent 
stages/days of development, even as the already loose parallel to the creation story begins 
to dissipate further. On the biblical second day of creation, God causes a great separation 
between the sky and the water:24 “And God said, Let there be a firmament in the midst of 
the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters. And God made the firmament, 
and divided the waters which were under the firmament from the waters which were 
above the firmament: and it was so. And God called the firmament Heaven” (Gen. 1:5- 
8; in the NIV, “Heaven” is translated “sky”). In Schreiner’s second stage, the reader 
strains to find the sort of parallels that seemed to offer themselves up in the first stage. 
The child does become aware of his own separation from the surrounding material world
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(“Material things still rule, but the spiritual and intellectual take their places” \Story 
138]), and he does develop a concept of self while looking up at the sky (“One day we sit 
there and look up at the blue sky, and down at our fat little knees; and suddenly it strikes 
us, Who are we? This I, what is it?” [139-note again, as with the binaries between light 
and dark in stage one, stage two also posits binary distinctions: matter vs. spirit, self vs. 
other]). However, it is a stretch to say that this section in any way directly parallels the 
biblical second day of creation. In the Bible, the firmament (sky) is placed over the 
material world (the water below); in Schreiner’s stage two, the material world “still 
rules.” Furthermore, whereas in Genesis God is actively engaged in the creation o f the 
sky, in stage two the child is depicted as the passive receptor of a suggestion (namely, his 
own separation from the surrounding material world) that is prompted by his 
contemplation of the sky.
Indeed, the more striking issue that comes into play in this stage is the 
introduction of fear into the child’s psyche: “We try to look in upon ourself, and ourself 
beats back upon ourself. Then we get up in great fear and run home as hard as we can. 
We can’t  tell what frightened us” (139); or again, on a dark night, “when we are afraid, 
we pray and shut our eyes. We press our fingers very hard upon the lids, and see dark 
spots moving round and round, and we know they are heads and wings of angels sent to 
take care of us . . .  It is very consoling” (138). The concept of fear is nowhere present in 
Genesis One, but is one of the first results o f the Fall in Genesis Three (Adam and Eve, 
fearing God’s wrath, “hid[e] themselves from the presence of the Lord God” [3:8] after 
they eat the fruit of the Tree o f the Knowledge of Good and Evil). Thus, in stage two we
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again encounter the two structural “failures” we identified at the outset of this thesis: 1) it 
does not adhere in any obvious way to the events of Day Two in Genesis, and 2) it is 
contaminated by an idea introduced only later in Genesis, and thus is “disordered” in 
terms of the original biblical structure.
This structural disorder continues into the third day/stage as well, which, like the 
first two stages, departs significantly from the biblical third day of creation (and almost 
seems to begin to invert the parallels). In the biblical creation narrative, life begins to 
flourish (“waters under the heaven [are] gathered together unto one place” [1:9], dry land 
appears, and vegetation is produced [“And the earth brought forth grass, and herb yielding 
seed after his kind, and the tree yielding fruit, whose seed was in itself, after his kind” 
[1:12]). Here, significantly, the author of Genesis makes it clear that God created life to 
contain within itself the ability to re-generate (through its seed). But, whereas the events 
o f the biblical Day Three suggest perpetual regeneration, Schreiner’s narrative suggests 
the opposite as the child’s questions begin to focus on perpetual damnation:
Occasionally, also, unpleasantly shrewd questions begin to be asked by someone, 
we know not who, who sits behind our shoulder . . .  we carry the questions to the 
grown-up people . .  . and they say it was kind of God to make hell, and very 
loving of Him to send men there; and besides, He couldn’t help himself; and they 
are very wise, we think, so we believe them-more or less. (140)
Even the child’s religiosity is motivated by the fear of damnation: “At night we are 
profoundly religious; even the ticking watch says ‘Eternity, eternity! Hell, hell, hell!” ’ 
(140).
The child’s questions in this stage are not only indicative of the way in which 
ideas introduced in future chapters of Genesis (the idea of punishment for evil in a place 
of eternal damnation; i.e., Hell) infiltrate Schreiner’s version of Genesis One, but they > 
also raise what most see as the central problem in the Genesis creation narrative itself 
(indeed, what is perhaps the most pressing theological/philosophical question raised in., 
the Bible): where does evil come from in a creation that is all good? After all, at the end 
o f his work God pronounces all he has made good: “And God saw every thing that he 
had made, and, behold, it was very good” (Genesis 1:31). Schreiner’s narrative thus 
reveals itself as nicely self-reflexive once again; using the Genesis framework, she raises 
the crucial theological problem with the Genesis account itself (how could good beget 
evil?). Thus, the binary divisions between good and evil, merciful and damning God, 
become increasingly stark, evidenced again in the way the child in this stage draws a 
strict division between the Old and New testaments: after reading Christ’s Sermon on the 
Mount (Matthew 5 ff.), the child asserts, “The Ten Commandments and the old ‘Thou 
Shalt’ we have heard about long enough, and don’t care about it; but this new law sets us 
on fire” (139).
These binary distinctions between old and new, judging and loving, hell and 
heaven, most obviously “contaminate” stage four, which is the last o f Schreiner’s stages 
to retain even loose (and ironically inverted) structural parallels to the Genesis account. 
On day four in the Bible, God creates the heavenly realms (“And God made two great 
lights, the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night; he made the 
stars also” [Genesis 1:16]). Yet again, Schreiner’s narrative parodically recodes the
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Genesis narrative: while sunlight imagery does abound on Schreiner’s fourth “day,” it 
serves to remind the child not of the “vault of heaven” but of hell:
We look at the walls of the farm-house . . .  with the merry sunshine playing over 
all, and do not see it. But we see a great white throne, and Him that sits on i t . . . 
And the music rises higher, and rends the vault of heaven with its unutterable 
sweetness. And we, as we listen, ever and anon, as it sinks on the sweetest, 
lowest note, hear a groan of the damned from below. We shudder in the sunlight.
(140)
It is also in the sunlight that the child remembers Jeremy Taylor’s Sermons on the 
torments of hell (the “real fire of which this temporal fire [i.e. the sun] is but a painted 
fire” [140-41]) and concludes in the face of such inexorable torment, “what matter 
sunshine and walls, men and sheep? The things which are seen are temporal, but the 
things which are not seen are eternal” (141) 25 Once again, Schreiner revises the Genesis 
account by both recalling the biblical narrative (via sunlight imagery) and ironically 
departing from that narrative (i.e, the sunlight recalls hell, not the “firmament of heaven” 
in which God places the sun).
The fourth stage is also, like the preceding three, infiltrated by the dichotomy, 
nowhere present in Genesis One, between a loving and judging God. Indeed, the “shrewd 
questions” pertaining to the existence of evil in the world are now “asked louder. We 
carry them to the grown-up people; they answer us, and we are not satisfied” (140). The 
Devil (thought not to be introduced in the Bible until Genesis 3:1) is identified as the one 
who sat “behind [the] shoulder” of the child in stage three and provoked the “shrewd
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questions:” “the Devil walks with us. . . He is never silenced—without mercy. Though 
the drops of blood stand out on your heart he will put his questions . . . ‘Is it good of God 
to make hell? Was it kind of Him to let no one be forgiven unless Jesus Christ died?’”
(141). Not only does the child recognize the dichotomy between a loving and damning 
God, but he also confronts the dichotomy between God’s goodness and his own innate 
depravity (again, a concept not understood to be introduced in Genesis until after the 
Fall): “God is good, very good. We are wicked, very wicked . . .  Too vile to live, too vile 
to die, too vile to creep over this, God’s earth, and move among His believing men”
(142). The “Devil” finally forces the child to face the Calvinist doctrine of the 
predestination of the elect: “Is it right there should be a chosen people? To Him, who is 
father to all, should not all be dear?” (142). It is no wonder that this is the point at which 
the child, like Schreiner herself, “flings” the Bible across the room; the allegory of 
creation (s)he is looking for is faltering structurally as it both proves incapable of one-to- 
one mimesis and becomes increasingly contaminated by binary distinctions that ought to 
have no place in her (re)created Genesis, since they are raised only in later chapters of the 
Bible.
From this point on, Schreiner’s narrative structure departs entirely from the 
Genesis text as the child/Schreiner begins to looks for a “way out” of the oppositional 
dichotomies presented in the first four stages. In the Genesis creation text, the 
oppositional hierarchies continue through the fifth and sixth days, as God creates animals 
and man (giving humans dominion over the “fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, 
and over the cattle, and over all the earth” [1:26]; he then commands man and woman to
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“replenish the earth, and subdue it” [1:28]). God finally rests on the seventh day (and 
even privileges this day over the others, blessing and sanctifying it [2:3]). Schreiner’s 
day of rest, however, is alarmingly displaced to day five: “Before us there were three 
courses possible-to go mad, to die, to sleep. We take the latter course; or Nature takes it 
for us” (144-note that the supernatural [God] is replaced here by Nature). Instead of 
being created, the “beasts, birds, the very flowers close their eyes, and the streams are still 
in winter; all things take rest; then why not the human reason also?” (144-45). Indeed, 
the Devil himself rests (in yet another radical revision of the Genesis text, where only 
God is present): “So the questioning Devil in us drops asleep” (145).
This displaced day of rest is perhaps the most obvious structural departure in the 
chapter; and the “contamination” of the allegory continues even here, as the sleeping soul 
dreams of an all-loving, all-beneficent Christ—obviously a New Testament figure 
(although the Bible itself holds that the pre-incamate Christ was present and active at the 
creation [cf. John 1:1]). The child has not been able to reconcile the dichotomy between 
a vengeful God and merciful Christ in his waking hours; he now attempts (for the last 
time, and only in the context of a dream) to retain a vestige of religious hope by 
privileging the merciful deity over the judging one. Initially, the child “find[s] Him in 
everything in those days” (145), and “laughs” when the “poor sleepy, half-dead Devil” 
rears his head with his old questions. The child sees in the “purple flowers” the eyes of 
Christ (145); feels he is holding Christ himself when he carries home the “little weary 
lamb” (145); and has compassion on the “drunken Kaffir” lying on the roadside in the 
sun, covering him with a blanket (“[God’s] Kaffir; why should the sun hurt him?” [145]).
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The child goes on to reconceive the biblical God (who places his judgement—i.e., death— 
upon all his creation as a consequence for Adam’s disobedience in Genesis Three) as a 
Being who shows only mercy toward his creation:
In the centre of all things is a Mighty Heart, which, having begotten all things,
. loves them; and, having bom them into life, beats with great throbs of love toward 
them. No death for His dear insects, no hell for His dear men, no burning up for 
His dear world-His own, own world that He has made. (145)
This dream quickly turns to nightmare, however, as the child cannot entirely banish the 
concept o f a judging deity from his mind, and finally rejects both the damning and 
merciful concepts of God entirely. Attending church with his father, the child listens to 
the preacher’s sermon upon the text, “ ‘He that believeth not shall be damned.’” The child 
knows the preacher’s words refer to the soul of the “magistrate’s clerk,” who professed to 
be an atheist and who “just the day before . .  . had died in the street, stmck by lightning” 
(146). As the preacher goes on to describe the outpouring of the wrath of the “Mighty 
One, whose existence [the clerk] had denied” and the damned soul’s flight into the 
“everlasting shade,” the child becomes enraged:
He lies! . . . That man in the pulpit lies! Will no one stop him? Have none of 
them heard—do none of them know, that when the poor dark soul shut its eyes on 
earth it opened them in the still light of heaven? that there is no wrath where 
God’s face is? . . . While the atheist lay wondering and afraid, God bent down and 
said, ‘My child, here I am . .  . Then the poor soul turned to the light,—its weakness 
and pain were gone forever. (146-47)
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Yet the child recognizes, even in the midst of his anger, that this idea of an all-merciful 
God is his own: when his father jolts him out of his angry reverie, the child admits he can 
“see nothing but [his] own ideas” (147). Indeed, in an earlier authorial interposition (in 
which Schreiner switches from present to past tense narrative), the soul cries, “Jesus!
You Jesus of our dream! How we loved you; no Bible tells o f  you as we knew;you” (145- 
-my italics). The child can now only awaken to what he has determined to be the “truth”: 
the non-existence of either of his previous versions of God.
This “awakening” occurs simultaneously in the next two sections, stages six and 
seven, which Schreiner conflates in her allegorical version of Genesis (i.e., both stages 
chronicle the child’s “time of waking” [148]). Again, this is another structural deviation 
from the biblical narrative, in which the creation of animals and humans occurs on day 
six, while God finally rests “from all his work which [he] created and made” on the 
seventh day (Genesis 2:3).26 In Schreiner’s account, the soul awakens in a manner that 
echoes the creation of man in Genesis 2:7 (note again, her Genesis One creation narrative 
is infiltrated by an event from Genesis Two), where God crafts Adam out of dust and 
breathes life into his nostrils: “now life takes us up between her finger and thumb, shakes 
us furiously . .  . and she sets us down a little hardly on the bare earth, bruised and sore, 
but pretematurally wide awake” (148)27. Here, anticipating the gender dynamics o f Part 
Two, the patriarchal God of Genesis has been displaced by a feminine entity; and, unlike 
Adam, who wakes to the natural world in the Garden of Eden, the soul in Schreiner’s 
account is “pretematurally” wide awake (suggesting that the soul has some kind of 
awareness that is outside of, or above, the natural realm). It is also ironic that, where
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Adam awakens to life, Schreiner’s soul awakens to death, as life begins to show it “new- 
made graves . . .  eyes that we love with worms eating them” (148). God is nowhere to be 
found in the garden of Schreiner’s sixth and seventh stages: “we cry to our beautiful 
dream-god . .  . now in our hour of need be near us. But He is not there; He is gone away” 
(149). It is indeed as if God himself—both the judging and merciful versions—have been 
cast out o f Schreiner’s garden, as is obvious in the opening of section seven:
Now we have no God. We have had two: the old God that our fathers handed 
down to us, that we hated, and never liked; the new one that we made for 
ourselves, that we loved; but now he has flitted away from us, and we see what he 
was made of—the shadow of our highest ideal, crowned and throned. Now we 
have no God. (149)
Indeed, the only “God” present throughout the rest o f the novel is Nature, personified as a 
female. It is only after the eradication of both diametrically opposing (just and merciful) 
conceptions of the Deity that the soul can truly “see” nature: “And now we turn to 
Nature. All these years we have lived beside her, and we have never seen her: now we 
open our eyes and look at her” (151). The soul becomes aware of the processes of 
evolution (and thus of another, secular creation story, Darwin’s, to rival the old, sacred 
one): “we look down and see [the stone] covered with the fossil footprints of great birds, 
and the beautiful skeleton of a fish” (152). Significantly, in stage seven the child himself 
displaces God as Creator: “We put a brown seed in the earth, and a living thing starts 
out—starts upwards . . . shaking brown seeds with little embryo souls onto the ground” 
(152-53; note the ironic echoes of the seed-bearing plants on the third day in Genesis).
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The soul recognizes a transcendental unity in all things, “not a chance jumble; a living 
thing, a One” (153). This holistic (and almost Harris-like) concept of the interrelatedness 
of all things allows the (now adult) soul to conclude (in a vision of the world resembling 
that of Ecclesiastes in its recognition of the cyclical nature of all things, but drawing an 
opposite conclusion as to the “vanity” [or “meaninglessness,” NIV] of these cycles):
And so it comes to pass in time, that the earth ceases for us to be a weltering 
chaos. We walk in the great hall of life, looking up and round reverentially. 
Nothing is despicable-#// is meaningful; nothing is small-all is part of a whole, 
whose beginning and end we know not. (154-my italics)
This “new life” envisioned in the seventh section is one that knows neither beginnings 
nor ends, but that nonetheless makes sense, precisely because it is positioned squarely in 
the middle of the novel.
It would seem, then, that Schreiner, through this ultimately parodic recoding of 
the Genesis One story (the inherent binarism of which is further emphasized by the 
contaminatory presence of the justice/mercy dichotomy , which was not originally part of 
that story) into a new, organic worldview, has managed to escape the dualistic thinking 
and language of her colonial/Victorian era. Yet Part Two of the novel, which traces 
Lyndall’s return to the farm, clandestine relationship with (and pregnancy by) an 
unnamed stranger, tragic illness following the death of her infant, and her own eventual 
death, remains fraught with the kinds of black and white dualisms Schreiner attempted to 
overthrow in both Part One and the “Times and Seasons” chapter.
This is perhaps most evident in Schreiner’s continued treatment of the African
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natives as “things” and “animals” in Part Two. As Lyndall and Gregory Rose sit together 
on the “kopje,” for instance, Gregory begs her to talk to him in the same serious way she 
does with W aldo.. Lyndall falls to observing a Kaffir man at the foot o f the kopje:
. . .  he is a splendid fellow—six feet high, with a magnificent pair o f legs.
In his leather bag he is going to fetch his rations, and I suppose to kick his 
wife with his beautiful legs when he gets home. He has a right to; he 
bought her for two oxen . .  . There is a lean dog going after him, to whom I 
suppose he never gives more than a bone from which he has sucked the 
marrow; but his dog loves him, as his wife does . . .  He is the most 
interesting and intelligent thing I can see just now, except, perhaps, Doss 
[a dog]. (227)
She goes on to muse, from the evolutionary perspective promoted in the last section of 
“Times and Seasons,” “Will his race melt away in the heat of a collision with a higher? 
Are the men o f the future to see his bones only in museums—a vestige o f one link that 
spanned between the dog and the white man?” (227-28). Later, as Waldo writes the story 
o f his years away from the farm during which he went out to “see the world” and worked 
as a clerk in a shop, he seems almost surprised to have found that the only “respectable 
thing in that store . . . was the Kaffir storeman. His work was to load and unload, and he 
never needed to smile except when he liked” (252-my italics). Finally, in perhaps the 
most racist passage of the entire novel, while Waldo is at work planing a new table for 
Em, he pauses to throw one of the curls of wood “down to a small naked nigger, who had 
crept from its mother . .  . From time to time the little animal lifted its fat hand as it
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expected a fresh shower of curls; till Doss . . . would catch the curl in his mouth and roll 
the little Kaffir over in the sawdust, much to that small animal’s contentment” (292—my 
italics; note how the actual animal, Doss, is called by name, while the Kaffir child is 
spoken of simply as an animal). In all these examples, the dichotomies of the Genesis 
narrative remain untransformed: the man versus animal opposition of the sixth day 
continues to govern Schreiner’s discourse; she has merely exchanged the literal beasts of 
Genesis for metaphorical ones (an exchange that is, moreover, basic to all racist 
discourse).
Another dichotomy that is not eradicated, but merely reversed, is that of man 
versus woman. In Genesis Two, Eve is created from Adam’s rib and is to be subservient 
to Adam, a “suitable helper” (Genesis 2:20) named “woman, for she was taken out of 
man” (2:23). Rather than eliminating the idea of superior/inferior manifest in this section 
of Genesis, Schreiner merely reverses that hierarchical order in the character of Lyndall. 
Lyndall is constantly asserting her independence from masculine domination, as she tells 
Em when the latter asks her if she is engaged: “I am not in so great a hurry to put my 
neck beneath any man’s foot; and I do not so greatly admire the crying of babies . . .
There are other women glad of such work” (184). She derides the attentions she receives 
from men when she tells Waldo, “You are our goods, our merchandise, our material for 
operating on; we buy you, we sell you, we keep six of you crawling to our little fe e t. . . 
We keep six of you dancing in the palm of one little hand . . .  then we throw you away, 
and you sink to the Devil” (192). Lyndall’s refusal to marry the handsome stranger 
whose child she carries, and her insistence upon giving birth to it alone in a hotel room in
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the Transvaal, further emphasize her resistance to and reversal of the biblical male/female 
roles. Finally, her relationship with the foppish Gregory Rose (who, Lyndall observes, is 
a “true woman—one bom for the sphere that some women have to fill without being born 
for it. How happy he would be sewing frills into his little girls’ frocks, and how pretty he 
would look sitting in a parlour, with a rough man making love to him!” [197]) in the 
chapter entitled “Gregory’s Womanhood” is the very epitome of male/female role 
reversal. As Lyndall, deliriously ill, but still determined never to submit to marriage, lies 
dying on a “crimson quilt” in a dark hotel room, Gregory Rose shaves his beard and 
dresses as a nurse to be near her until her death. He becomes the servant, the helper (and 
to him “his hands were glorified for what they had done” [273]), while Lyndall remains 
hardened toward her dead infant (“I did not love it; its father was not my prince; I did not 
care for it” [278]) and continues, even in her weakness, to act as “master” over Gregory 
Rose (although she believes she is paying a hired female nurse to care for her). Thus, the 
biblical picture of woman as man’s helper is turned on its head—another example of 
Schreiner’s inability to wrest herself free from the polarized dualisms perpetuated by 
biblical texts like the Genesis story and, by extension, the colonial culture at large.
Finally, the very dichotomy between God’s justice (requiring death) and mercy 
(offering eternal life) that predominated in both Part One and “Times and Seasons” 
continues to haunt the characters (and, by extension, the reader) in Part Two. This is 
especially evident in Waldo’s reaction to Gregory Rose’s recounting of the story of 
Lyndall’s death. After discovering that Lyndall (whom he has loved his entire life) has 
died, Waldo awakens from a dream in which he imagined her still alive and in love with
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him and, gripped with grief, flings the door open to look at the stars (in which, said Otto 
in Part One, the “souls we loved lived” [55]). Longing for Lyndall to be alive 
somewhere, he searches the stars’ “solitary grandeur” (286)--only to “shudder,. . .  at last 
turnfing] away from them in horror. Such countless multitudes . . . and yet not in one of 
them all was she! . . r. Year after year, century after century, the old changes of nature 
would go on . . .  but in none of them would she have part!” (286-87). Waldo paces the 
room frantically, “pain ma[king] his soul weak; it cried for the old faith” (287). Indeed, 
Waldo calls out in desperate prayer, “Oh, God! God! for a Hereafter!” (287). Waldo’s 
longing for the “old faith”—and his (and the reader’s) knowledge that it cannot be 
recovered because of Waldo’s/Schreiner’s failure to reconcile the ideas of divine justice 
and mercy—render this passage one of the most despairing in the novel’s second half.
The “old God” of sovereign wrath also continues to make itself felt in the second 
half through the actions and beliefs o f the matriarch Tant Sannie, who is depicted as too 
foolish even to raise the religious questions concerning God’s justice and mercy that 
torment Waldo throughout the novel. Indeed, in the final chapter it is obvious that Tant 
Sannnie assumes the concept o f a deity who is sovereign over, and wrathful toward, 
human affairs to be the correct one—be it in her views on human procreation (“If a 
woman’s old enough to marry, and doesn’t, she’s sinning against the Lord . .  . What, does 
she think the Lord took all that trouble in making her for nothing? It’s evident He wants 
babies, otherwise why does He send them?” [293]) and on nineteenth-century scientific 
progress:
It’s with all these new inventions that the wrath of God must fall on us. What
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were the children of Israel punished for, if  it wasn’t for making a golden calf? . . .  
Let them make their steam-waggons and their fire-carriages; let them go on as 
though the dear Lord didn’t know what he was about when He gave horses and 
oxen legs,—the destruction of the Lord will follow them. I don’t know how such 
people read their Bibles. When do we hear of Moses or Noah riding in a railway? 
(294)
Tant Sannie’s reflections thus ironically hearken back to the beginning of the novel (and 
of “Times and Seasons”), as they recall and echo Waldo’s Old Testament God o f wrath. 
The opposition between justice versus mercy remains ironically, parodically, present at 
the end o f a novel from which it cannot be eliminated, try as the author might to do so.
Finally, Tant Sannie’s disparaging commentary on the modem creations of the 
late nineteenth-century (“steam-waggons” and “fire-carriages”) is also an example of the 
various ways in which Schreiner disparages the act of creation in Part Two. Indeed, in 
the second half of the novel creation itself becomes an almost grotesque undertaking: 
Waldo’s carving (which it took him “nine months” to produce [158]) is described as 
depicting a “grotesque little mannikin at the bottom” (159), its portrayal o f “men and 
birds . . . almost grotesque in their laboured resemblance to nature, [bearing] signs of 
patient thought” (157);28 and, in a speech that eerily foreshadows the death of Lyndall’s 
“creation,” her newborn child, Lyndall states,
I would not like to bring a soul into this world. When it sinned and when it 
suffered, something like a dead hand would fall on me [ironically, it is Lyndall’s 
hand that closes over the cold feet o f her dying child (278)]-‘You did it, you, for
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your own pleasure you created this thing! See your work! ’ . . .  A parent is only 
like to God: if his work turns out bad so much the worse for him; he dare not 
wash his hands of it. (209)
The repeated failure to create anew in Part Two of the novel locates us at the problematic 
site of the “post”--the space after the attempted “new creation,” in which the old 
uncannily repeats itself in different contexts. As I have argued, Schreiner’s “post”
Genesis narrative is ultimately not “post” anything, but remains firmly ensconced within 
the original binary discourse it trys to undermine; it cannot, as it were, wash its hands of 
creation and the stories that attach to it. But this is not to say that the work has “turned 
out bad” and that we should wash our hands of it. In its ambivalent inclusion of and 
working through of colonial discourse (via its adoption of the binary structures that are 
basic, for instance, to the Genesis story), as well as in its repeated if  “failed” attempt to 
envision a post-colonial world (from which those structures would be eradicated), Story is 
an exemplary postcolonial text. Indeed, its very genius lies in this problematic mixture of 
the old worlds it repeats and the new worlds of which it dreams.
CONCLUSION: “THE MARK OF THE OLD WOUND”
He touched the dying animal light at last as it ran past him and it turned its head 
around towards him, a little startled by his alien fingers and hand, remembering 
something forgotten. The alert dreaming skin—radiant with spiritual fear and 
ecstasy—quivered and vibrated like the strings of a harp where the mark of the old 
wound was and it tossed the memory of the spear on its head, trying to recall the 
miracle of substance and flesh. It stood thus—with the carpenter’s hand upon 
it—with a curious abstract and wooden memory of its life and its death. The 
sense of death was a wooden dream, a dream of music in the sculptured ballet of 
the leaves and the seasons, the shavings on the ground from the carpenter’s saw
and chisel.
Wilson Harris, Palace of the Peacock
To return, finally, to a comparison of Schreiner’s Story and Harris’s Palace of the
Peacock, one cannot help but note the disparity in the moods of their respective endings.
Why, when both authors reinscribe the Genesis story, “miscegenating” or “creolizing”
their texts in order to rewrite the central biblical text of Empire, does one tale end in
religious despair and, ultimately, nihilism (even Schreiner’s concept of the “Universal
Unity,” in which the souls of the departed supposedly partake, is characterized at the end
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of the novel as a “dream and phantom” [290-91]), the other in a vision of rebirth and 
regeneration, an almost religious hope? For, indeed, Story ends in Waldo’s solitary 
death, after he learns he will never “possess” Lyndall as his own, with only a few 
disinterested chickens looking on; Palace ends in the symbolic rebirth of the already twice 
dead crew members, each of them holding “at last in his arms what he had been for ever 
seeking and what he had eternally possessed” fPalace 117). Is this difference in mood 
and outcome merely a function of their differing historical moments? That is to say, was 
Harris’s ability to re-vision the colonial experience, its discourse and its narratives, in a 
more positive way due only to the fact that he lived and wrote at a time of 
decolonization? That he lived and wrote at a time when the deconstruction of binary 
oppositions was becoming more conceivable (as the ascension of 
postmodern/poststructuralist thinking would suggest)?
While both these arguments are salient, I would like to nuance them by 
suggesting, in conclusion, that Harris “succeeds” where Schreiner “fails” because, in 
Palace, he pursues a vision of the biblical account of Christ’s death on the cross as 
effecting a reconciliation between God’s justice and mercy, thereby coming to terms with 
the very dichotomy, as I have argued, that stymied Schreiner’s attempt to “write out o f ’ 
the binary colonial discourse of her day. A brief look at two remarkably similar chapters 
in both novels—“Waldo’s Stranger” in Schreiner’s Story, and the final section of Palace. 
“Paling of Ancestors”—will elucidate what I will argue is the central cause of the novels’ 
widely divergent endings: namely, their contrasting readings of the Bible itself.
The chapter entitled “Waldo’s Stranger” immediately follows the “Times and
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Seasons” chapter, and opens at the same moment as does “Times and Seasons” : “Waldo 
lay on his stomach on the red sand” (137; 155). Indeed, the seven stages o f “Times and 
Seasons” have been an interruption of the sequential narrative initiated in Part One, which 
is now taken up again in “Waldo’s Stranger.” The chapter, like “Times and Seasons,” is 
also allegorical (and is more obviously so, one might add). However, in contrast to the 
previous allegory, which “failed” to mimic its biblical model, the so-called “Allegory of 
the Hunter” in “Waldo’s Stranger” does not attempt to mimic another text at all, but is a 
self-consciously original allegory in its own right.29 Moreover, theologically speaking, it 
begins where “Times and Seasons” ended—that is, at the place where God has been 
replaced by Nature, the Bible by Science. The allegory is related by a stranger who stops 
to rest at the farm, and who (in contrast to St. Paul’s vision of charity as outlined in 1 
Corinthians 13:7) “believes nothing, hopes nothing, fears nothing, feels nothing”
(159)— an indication of the direction his allegory will take. As he examines Waldo’s 
carving, his “wooden post,” the stranger allegorizes the meaning of the “grotesque 
figures” carved thereupon as the story of a hunter who one day catches a glimpse of a 
“vast white bird . .  . sailing in the everlasting blue” (160); Wisdom later tells the Hunter 
chat what he has seen is the White Bird of Truth (160). The Hunter becomes obsessed 
with capturing her, and spends his life hoping to possess what Wisdom tells him he will 
“never see, never hold . .  . Nothing but Truth can hold Truth” (162). As he travels, the 
Hunter must abandon comforting beliefs (i.e., the birds, “fed on the grains of credulity,” 
that cry “a human-God!” “Immortality!” and “Reward after Death!” [161]), wander alone 
into the land of Absolute Negation and Denial (where the “merry wisp lights” of
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Sensuality tempt him), resist the lures of the lands of Superstition and Despair, and, 
finally, encounter the “mighty mountains of Dry-facts and Realities” (166).
It is upon these mountains that the Hunter begins to scale a “mighty wall o f rock, 
smooth and without break, stretching as far as the eye could see” (166). The Hunter 
grows old and weary as he spends the rest o f his life hewing stairs and carving footholds 
in the rock; until he can work no more and lies down to die with the “comfort” that by the 
steps he has carved other men will ascend: “by the stairs I have cut they will climb . . .  At 
the clumsy work they will laugh; when the stones roll they will curse me. But they will 
mount, and on my work” (168). It is only now, with the “mist of death in his eyes,” that 
the Bird o f Truth flies overhead, dropping a single feather onto the dying Hunter’s breast 
(168). After a lifetime pursuit of Truth, the Hunter learns that She is actually unknowable 
to the individual. The only “knowledge” he can hold onto is that others (who will “never 
know the name” of the one who went before [168]) will use his work to come closer to 
capturing Truth, and that, as Wisdom had earlier counseled, when “enough of those silver 
feathers shall have been gathered by the hands of men, and . . . woven into a cord, and the 
cord into a net, that in that net Truth may be captured” (162). Moreover, it is only the 
scientist—the one who actually resists the lures of religion and sensuality to begin 
tackling stern reality—who can contribute to the formation of this net (though the 
suggestion seems to be that the quest to form this net will be interminable, as the 
mountains at last visible at the apex of the Hunter’s climb/lifetime rise “etemal[ly]” into 
the clouds [168]).
In essence, then, the allegory of the Hunter and the Genesis allegory in “Times
and Seasons” can be read as counterparts: “Times and Seasons” writes through the 
biblical text to arrive at a complete rejection of the Bible and its dichotomies in favor of 
Science; the allegory of the Hunter solidifies this rejection and goes further to expose 
even Science as next to futile in revealing ultimate “Truth” (reinforced by the Stranger’s 
musing, as he watches Waldo’s passionate reaction to both the allegory and the book by 
Herbert Spencer that he gives to Waldo: “Poor devil! . . .  He smiled, and then sighed 
wearily, very wearily” [173]). The chapter ends with a sentence that recalls the images of 
sunshine in stage four o f “Times and Seasons (which for the child inspired thoughts of 
hell and damnation): “There was a rare beauty to him in the sunshine that evening”
(173). On first reading this chapter-ending seems to offer a moment of unadulterated 
optimism, but upon finishing the novel one realizes that it is actually steeped in irony, 
because it foreshadows Waldo’s death “in the yellow sunshine,” on a “sunshiny 
afternoon,” in the midst of a “sunshiny dream” (300). Waldo’s sense of the “rare beauty” 
in the sunshine, like Schreiner’s sense of the “throb of Universal Life” underlying all 
things (290), is thus at the end of the novel exposed as a “dream and phantom” (291); 
indeed, the only “reality” left at the end of Story is the very failure o f  stories, whether 
those of the Bible or of Science, to counter the nihilism of existence.
While both the allegory of the Hunter and Story as a whole end upon a nihilistic 
note, Harris’s “Paling of Ancestors”— a similar recounting of one man’s pursuit of truth 
up the face of a cliff in which he must hew his own footholds— begins at this nihilistic 
juncture, and moves, unlike Schreiner’s narrative, from despair to religious hope. After 
five days pursuing the runaway “folk” upriver, Donne (along with Jennings and daSilva,
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the only two of his river crew left alive) has reached the “wall and cliff of heaven,” which 
he must scale in order to discover (and re-cover) the beginning, the “indestructible 
nucleus and redemption of creation” (Palace 101). As mentioned above, the journey is, 
up until this point, a reverse parallel movement through the seven days of creation as 
outlined in Genesis One. However, as Donne reaches this fifth day, he, like Schreiner’s 
soul in stage five, recognizes the need for a departure. He has lost most of his crew, the 
“old Arawak woman” (their guide) has disappeared (99), and, in a moment of self­
reflection, he recognizes the “horror and hell” (101) of his harsh rule of the Guyanese 
aboriginals:
And a wave of hopelessness enveloped him: everyone in the vessel was 
crumbling into a door into the sun through which one perceived nothing 
standing—the mirror of absolute nothingness. An abstraction grew around 
him—nothing else—the ruling abstraction of himself which he saw reflected 
nowhere. He was a ruler o f men and a ruler of nothing. (99)
Donne here admits that he cannot return home to his former life as master over slaves; 
that to “return to a ruling function of nothingness and to a false sense of home was the 
meaning of hell” (99). As he gazes up the “steep spirit of the c liff’ that he knows he must 
climb, Donne acknowledges the need for a new beginning; he longs for the universal 
truth, the “atom, the very nail of moment in the universe” (101).
Harris’s use of the word “nail” to characterize the supreme “moment” of meaning 
and truth points toward what will clearly become, for Donne, the “abstract image and 
correspondence, in which all things and events gained their substance and universal
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meaning” (101): the nailing of Christ upon the cross. Even the above phrase, which 
encapsulates Donne’s desire to find absolute meaning, rings with the cadence of Acts 
17:28, where St. Paul speaks to the men of Athens and states, “For in [Christ] we live, 
and move, and have our being.” The desire to return to the beginning of creation and 
thereby to locate the “abstract image” in which “all things [gain] their substance and 
universal meaning” also hearkens to St. Paul’s letter to the Colossians, where he argues 
that Christ himself was “before” creation:
[Christ] is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature: For by 
him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth . . . all things 
were created by him, and for him: And he is before all things, and by him all 
things consist. (Col. 1:15-17)
The above passage of scripture goes on to describe God’s reconciliation of his fallen 
creation to himself, which Paul saw as effected through Christ’s death on the cross: “For 
it pleased the Father that in him should all fulness dwell; And, having made peace 
through the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile all things unto him self’ (Col. 1:19-20).
What becomes more and more evident as Donne progresses up the cliff is the 
image of Christ’s sacrifice upon the cross, and the synthesis of God’s justice and mercy 
that death accomplished (see, among others, Romans 3:25, where Christ’s death is 
described as the “propitiation” for the sin of humankind—that is, God’s mercy given 
becausehis justice is satisfied; Col. 2:14, where Paul notes that the “handwriting of 
ordinances that was against us” [i.e., the old law] was “[taken] out of the way, nail[ed] to 
the cross; and Eph. 2:15-16, where Paul, writing to the Gentiles in Ephesus, describes the
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synthesis o f Old and New, Jew and Gentile, effected in the cross [“having abolished in his 
flesh the enmity, even the law of commandments contained in the ordinances; for to make 
in himself of twain one new man, so making peace; And that he might reconcile both 
unto God in one body by the cross”]). Donne’s climb becomes a visionary sequence, in 
which he sees various figures in the side of the cliff (almost as if he is looking through a 
window). The first figure he sees is a “young carpenter,” the “craftsman of God,” who is 
hewing out of the “cedar of Lebanon” a rectangular face with hair that “parted itself in the 
middle and fell on both sides of his face into a harvest. . . Every movement and glance 
and expression was . . .  the divine alienation and translation of flesh and blood into 
everything and anything on earth” (102). The allusions to Christ, while not in any way 
exactly parallel to biblical narrative (as is fitting, given the “creolized” nature of Harris’s 
text), are obvious: the Jesus of the Bible was a carpenter (Mark 6:3); traditional exegesis 
holds that Christ himself was the “cedar of Lebanon” spoken of in the Old Testament 
(Psalm 92:12); the “translation of flesh and blood” into “everything and anything on 
earth” is almost a reverse incarnation (in which, according to scripture, spirit became 
flesh and blood); or the “translation” could be read as what Christ accomplished on the 
cross, i.e. the “translation” of his flesh and blood into ah atoning sacrifice for the sins of 
humankind. These references, coupled with the recurring image of a swallow 
(traditionally, a symbol of the Resurrection) that flits “in and out o f the room” and is 
reflected in the “dark eyes” of the carpenter (102), suggest the biblical Christ figure.
The rest of the narrative continues to solidify this reading, as Donne, knowing the 
“chisel and the saw in the room had touched him and done something . . .  to make him
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anew” (102), begins to hammer on the wall of the cliff to attract the carpenter’s attention. 
The carpenter turns his gaze upon Donne, who then sees the “image of Death in the 
carpenter” (103) and, immediately after this vision, sees a homed animal “bounding 
towards him through the prehistoric hole in the c liff. . .  It had a wound in its side from a 
spear” (103). Again, these images allude to Christ’s death on the cross, where according 
to scripture “one of the soldiers with a spear pierced his side” (Jn. 19:34). Moreover, in 
the Old Testament, homed animals—specifically “bulls”—were to be used as sin 
offerings for the Israelites (see Lev. 4:1-5:13; 6:24-30; 8:14-17; 16:3-22); in the New 
Testament, according to Hebrews 10:1-18, Christ takes the place of homed animals such 
as bulls and goats as a perfect and final “sin offering” for all of humankind—an apt 
example of the synthesis (“creolization”) of Old Testament justice (requiring constant 
atonement for sin via animal sacrifice, the animals “standing in the place o f ’ the people) 
and New Testament mercy (Christ’s death finished the “work” of animal sacrifice, as both 
a person [not an animal] standing in the place of other people, and, according to scripture, 
as a perfect representative of persons standing in the place of other persons [Eph. 2:14ff]). 
Finally, as the homed animal dies, the room becomes illuminated with the “richest 
impressions of eternity,” perhaps signaling the fact that, according to scripture, Christ’s 
death made “eternal life” available to all humankind (cf. Mk. 10:30; Mt. 25:46; Jn. 3:16, 
10:28,17:2; Rom. 6:23; 1 Tim. 6:12; et. al.).
It is also at this point that another “death” occurs when Jennings “slipp[ed] 
suddenly in the dark upon a step in the cliff’ (105). Now, as the narrator tells us, only 
Donne and daSilva are left to wonder “whose turn would be next to fall from the sky as
70
the last ghost of the crew had died and they alone were left to frame Christ’s tree and 
home” (106), yet another reference to the cross. As they continue climbing upward,
Donne and daSilva “c[o]me upon another window in the wall” (106), this one containing 
a different image of the biblical Christ—the infant Jesus and the Madonna (note the 
reversal o f biblical narrative order: i.e., Christ’s death is depicted before his birth).
Donne, filled with longing and feeling a “glowing intimacy,” looks into the room and sees 
that it is “Bare, unfurnished, save for a crib in a stall that might have been an animal’s 
trough” (106), alluding to the manger into which Mary placed the infant Christ (Lk.
2:7; 12; 16). He also sees a woman with a “child [who] also stood at her feet” (Palace 
106), images which are “drawn with such slenderness and everlasting impulse one knew 
it was richer than all the images of seduction combined to the treasuries of the east”
(107). The very epigraph to”Paling of Ancestors,” an excerpt from Gerard Manley 
Hopkins’s poem “The Starlight Night,” foreshadows the image of the Christ and 
Madonna Donne encounters: “This piece-bright paling shuts the spouse / Christ home, 
Christ and his mother and all his hallows.” Indeed, it seems here that Donne himself is 
gazing through the “piece-bright paling” upon the image of “Christ and his mother.”
As Donne watches mother and child, he suddenly loses the physical sense of sight, 
becoming “truly blind at last,” as he also recognizes his own worthlessness, noting “. . . 
the unflinching clarity with which he looked into himself and saw that all his life he had 
loved no one but him self. . .  It was his blindness that made him see his own nothingness”
(108). This is yet another (ironically inverted) reference to scripture, in which 
“blindness” is equated with spiritual unbelief, “sight” with spiritual understanding (Mt.
23:16ff, where Jesus continually calls the unbelieving Pharisees “blind;” see also Jn.
9:40; 2 Cor. 3:14; 2 Pet. 1:9). Here, Donne’s apex of spiritual understanding (“as one 
looking into the void of oneself upon the far greater love . . . that has made the universe” 
[107]) occurs simultaneously with the realization of his blindness.
It is Donne’s physical blindness that finally leads to his death as well, as he and 
daSilva can no longer climb and reach the point of exhaustion and fall from the cliff on 
“the dawn of the sixth day of creation” (108; again, note the inversion o f biblical 
narrative; humans are created on the sixth day in Genesis; here, Donne and daSilva die, 
but are symbolically re-created on the seventh day, as discussed below). In death they 
reach the ultimate destination for which the novella is named: the “Palace of the 
Peacock,” which manifests itself as the image of the longed-for “atom,” the “nail of the 
moment in the universe.” Here the Palace, the culmination of Donne’s symbolic journey 
and quest for truth, is pictured as merging the Old Testament tree that brought death and 
damnation (the Tree of Knowledge) with the New Testament tree that brought life and 
salvation (the cross of Christ):
I saw the tree in the distance wave its arms and walk when I looked at it through 
the spiritual eye of my sou l . . .  The bark and wood turned to lightning flesh and 
the sun which had been suspended from its head rippled and broke into stars that 
stood where the shattered leaves had been . . .  The stars became peacock’s eyes, 
and the great tree of flesh and blood swirled into another stream that sparkled with 
divine feathers where the neck and the hands and the feet had been nailed. (112)
Perhaps this vision is what has allowed Harris to assert that, even in the face of
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postmodernist scepticism, “one can have a religious hope,” as his reading of the cross as 
effecting reconciliation between Old and New, justice and mercy, seems to point toward a 
more “creolized” understanding of the Bible as a whole than did Schreiner’s—an 
understanding that allows him to overcome the “sense of death” with which Schreiner’s 
' novel concludes, to re-vision this death as a “wooden dream.” At the end of Harris’s 
novel, this dream of death makes way for the beginning of a new life of “fulfilment and 
understanding”-—the new life that ushers forth, startlingly, paradoxically, from “the mark 
o f the old wound” (104).
*  3|C *
As I have attempted to show in this conclusion, the construction of Harris’s 
“palace,” and of his Palace as a whole, is deeply indebted to a religious vision that 
understands and takes into account the synthesizing work of the cross. While more than 
plausible, this conclusion itself needs to be supplemented by one last, cautionary note: 
when positing any interpretation of Harris’s work, we must always take care to keep in 
mind that according any “one” meaning to Harris’s texts flies in the face o f his fictional 
project, and for this reason the undeniable presence of Christological symbolism at the 
end of the novel should be read as only one hermeneutic key among many, opening the 
door to only one of many possible interpretations of Palace. As I noted in Part One of 
this thesis, Harris’s aesthetic program is a field of experiment in which nothing is ever 
finished; it is a “beginning” that is constantly in a state of revision (an “unfinished
Genesis,” to use Harris’s own term for it). Indeed, Harris’s work so vehemently resists 
singular interpretation that one might just as easily construct an argument that Palace 
recounts a journey through the illusions of conventional religious faith into a new 
spiritual vision that both eradicates and includes those former “illusions” (for the “many 
rooms of the palace where [Donne and the crew] stood” [recalling John 14:2, “In my 
Father’s house are many mansions”] are “free from the chains of illusion we had made 
without” [Palace 116]). Perhaps it is, finally, the very fact of this resistance to singular 
interpretation that allows Harris to image truth as a brilliantly plumed tail of feathers, so 
much more diverse and substantial than the solitary feather that drops onto the chest of 
the exhausted hunter from the elusive “vast white bird of truth” that Schreiner’s Waldo 
spends his life hunting after: “It was a feather. He died holding it” (Story 169).
NOTES
1. Arif Dirlik, Anne McClintock, and Stuart Hail have all noted the "academic 
marketability" (McClintock, quoted in Hall 243) of the term "post-colonial" in American 
academia today. Dirlik says the post-colonial is "a post-structuralist, post-foundationalist 
discourse, deployed mainly by displaced Third World intellectuals making good in 
prestige Ivy League American Universities and deploying the fashionable language of the 
linguistic and cultural "turn’ to ‘rephrase’ Marxism, returning it ‘to another First World 
language with universalistic epistemological pretensions’" (quoted in Hall 243).
2. There is currently no published critical study that has read the "Times and Seasons" 
chapter in Story as an allegory of the seven days of creation in Genesis One. The present 
study aims not only to argue for this reading, but to posit, further, that the allegory’s very 
"failure" (its parodicity, to use a term I introduce later) helps situate the novel squarely 
within the body of postcolonial literature.
3. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are taken from the King James Version of 
the Bible.
4. Berkman notes that Schreiner "may have taken this image from Darwin's Origin of 
Species, where the tree of life . . . appears in an extended metaphor" (Berkman 268). 
However, she fails to mention the biblical source in Genesis 3:22: "And the Lord God 
said, ‘The man has now become like one of us, knowing good and evil. He must not be 
allowed to reach out his hand and take also from the tree of life and eat, and live forever.'"
5. Schreiner’s religious upbringing was anything but homogeneous. Rather, the 
particular brand of Christianity she rejected was actually a mixture of several conflicting 
religious sects. On the one hand, her mother’s family were originally Wesleyan 
Methodists, but eventually followed George Whitefield (evangelist of the first Great 
Awakening) in his acceptance of the Calvinist doctrine of the predestination of the elect. 
Her mother Rebecca was strict, puritanical, and "considered childhood submission to 
adults and older siblings the moral correlative to human submission to God, female to
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75male, and blacks to whites" (Avrech-Berkman 16). Her mother also, according to 
Schreiner, frequently exploited religious terror in her methods of child rearing (17). Her 
father, Gottlob Schreiner, on the other hand, was a Wesleyan (Methodist), and therefore 
Arminian in his thinking (everyone has a chance for salvation, not just the elect; 
moreover, humans play a part in their own salvation in that they have the "free will" to 
either accept or reject God’s grace). According to Schreiner, he was "infinitely tenderer 
to us as children and had a much greater heart than my mother" (quoted in First and Scott 
47). Her parents’ divergent theologies, and consequent attitudes and actions toward 
others, thus typified the justice/mercy dichotomy with which Schreiner wrestled, and 
more than likely abetted her eventual disillusionment with and rejection of the Christian 
faith.
6. Cf. Augustine, On Genesis Against the Manicheans (De Genesi contra Manichaeos), 
Books 1-5, in which Augustine reads Genesis One allegorically as both a history of 
humankind from Adam to the end of the world and as an allegory of a single human life 
from birth to death; "Caedmon’s Hymn," the earliest extant poem in English; Milton’s 
Paradise Lost: and Jacques’ speech on the Ages of Man in Shakespeare’s As You Like It.
7. Homi Bhabha has pointed out that reading colonial texts as uniformly 
socially/historically mimetic merely "foster[s] their reabsorption into an English tradition, 
domesticating their radicalism by ignoring the important colonial disruptions to the 
'English' suface of the text" (Ashcroft 34; see Bhabha, "Representation"). The present 
study focuses on one such "disruption:" that is, "undomesticated" postcolonial parodies 
of the Genesis creation account.
8. Earlier critics have almost without exception dismissed Story as haphazard and 
lacking in structural unity. Elaine Showalter asserts that Schreiner had "no idea how to 
construct a novel" (Showalter, Review 106) and that "the labors of construction and 
plotting were beyond her" (Literature 198); Vineta Colby finds "glaring flaws" in Story 
(Colby 62); Richard Rive flatly states that "the loose manner in which [Schreiner] puts 
down her thoughts, regardless o f the principal theme of the book, often detracts from the 
aesthetic value of her novels" (Rive 240); and Uys Krige describes certain allegorical 
passages in Story as "sticking out from the rest of the book like the exposed scaffolding 
o f an uncompleted building" (Krige 7). Recent years, by contrast, have marked a drastic 
shift in how Story’s idiosyncrasies are read: see Gerald Monsman, 50-51; and Rachel 
Blau Duplessis, 21. For the favorable opinions of other South African writers, see Doris 
Lessing, 97-129; Nadine Gordimer, 20-21; and Stephen Gray, 143. For a recent general 
introduction to her life and work, see Clayton.
9. Indeed, as the authors of The Empire Writes Back suggest, recognizing that the 
metropolitan center itself is only a linguistic/cultural construct can have a liberating effect 
for postcolonial writers. When the powerless move beyond the assumption that "words
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are the signifiers of a pre-given reality, a reality and a truth which is only located at the 
centre" (Ashcroft 89), and recognize the extent to which the imperial center is a purely 
linguistic/cultural construct, the center of order becomes "the ultimate disorder. This 
perception is both the ultimate rebellion and the ultimate unveiling performed by post­
colonial literature. There is no centre of reality just as there is no pre-given unmediated 
reality. I f  language constructs the world then the margins are the centre and may 
reconstruct it according to a different pattern of conventions, expectations, and 
experiences" (90-91).
10. Superimpositions of this sort are at the heart o f what critics have identified as the 
essentially allegorical nature of colonial discourse—its inability to start anew, its 
insistence (from Columbus’s first acts of naming onward) on "read[ing] the territory of 
the other by reference to an anterior set of signs already situated in a cultural thematics," 
thereby making the "new world . . .  contingent upon the old" (Slemon 161).
11. Hutcheon notes that the OED definition of parody as a "ridiculing imitation" derives 
from the etymological assumption that the only correct translation of the Greek "parodia" 
is "counter-song." She goes on to argue that the root "para" can also be translated 
"beside," therefore suggesting an "accord or intimacy rather than a contrast" (32).
12. See notes 17 and 18 on E. K. Brathwaite, below, for a discussion of this 
simultaneous movement into both past and future in Caribbean literature.
13. For a detailed account of Schreiner’s representations of blacks, see Raiskin, 79-94.
14. The phrase "the second death" alludes to Revelation 20:14: "Then death and Hades 
were thrown into the lake of fire. The lake of fire is the second death." Ironically, Harris 
evokes this biblical image of the end of all things to title the chapter that initiates a 
journey in which Donne and his river crew will, in effect, reach the "beginning" of all 
things as their journey culminates at the Palace of the Peacock, where the narrator sees the 
faces of all the crew members who died during the journey. The biblical "second death," 
then, in Harris’s fiction, is re-visioned as a second life—another example of postcolonial 
appropriation o f the Judeo-Christian traditions imported by the British Empire.
15. See Sandra Drake 67; Michael Gilkes, Wilson Harris 24; Hena Maes-Jelinek, Naked 
Design 56. Barbara Webb is the only critic who has explicitly stated that the seven-day 
journey in Palace is "a paradoxical reversal of the seven days of creation" (77); however, 
she fails to support this contention with any kind of textual reference or demonstration. 
Jean-Pierre Durix convincingly argues that the seven-day period of "stripping" in The
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Secret Ladder is a "genesis in reverse" (34), but does not extend his argument to Palace. 
Hena Maes-Jelinek's The Naked Design shows how Palace is an "architectural, dynamic 
revision and reconstitution of the past" (19) and argues that "creation involves 
destruction, the breaking down of what would otherwise be a rigid construction" (43), but 
never traces this "breaking down" through the seven-day biblical account. Certainly a 
developed reading of Donne's river journey as (re)mapping the biblical Genesis in reverse 
is highly overdue.
16. O f course, in offering this particular reading I am aware that it is (and should be) 
only one of a myriad number of possible interpretations. To argue for any "final" reading 
o f Harris's work would be to contradict the aesthetic grounds upon which he builds (and 
upon which I have built my argument in this essay), as it would relegate the critic to the 
realm of Manichean dualisms and hierarchical structure from which Harris's fiction 
strives to break free. His method of accomplishing this through the marriage of 
contraries ("creolization") is discussed below. For a related, but decidedly more 
straightforward, Latin American "reversal" of the Genesis narrative, see Alejo 
Carpentier’s The Lost Steps (1953).
17. In removing the final "e" from "name" to coin a term that designates an "original" 
identity, Brathwaite acknowledges that one's journey into the past cannot reveal an 
authentic identity, but only a "reduction of the original, its translation into something 
other than what it once was" (Bongie 57)--that is, one's original "name" transformed by 
the effects o f creolization. In this sense the journey backward (toward one's "name") will 
inevitably and simultaneously be a movement forward (as one's modem vantage point 
reveals that "name" has become "nam," thus pointing to a present and future "creolized" 
identity). One's "nam," then, is paradoxically both aboriginal and aboriginal.
18. Brathwaite travels into the past to recover an ancestral "nam," and aboriginal 
essence, which he sees as authentic; Harris travels backward toward a "nam(e)less and 
therefore (in Harris's terms) more authentic dimension of being" (Maes-Jelinek, Naked 
Design 10). Furthermore, Brathwaite claims time and space must be hierarchically 
reversed in a post-colonial context; Harris claims that "space 'annihilates' time as it 
establishes itself as the primary category, the 'womb' of space from which and to which 
temporal structures and constructions arise and return" (Griffiths, "Post-Colonial Space 
and Time," 67). Griffiths argues in favor of a "more integrative account of post-colonial 
critical positions in the Caribbean which will acknowledge both the powerful differences 
and the great similarities of the two main streams of critical thought that I have 
represented by the work of Brathwaite and Harris" (69). My own analysis supports this 
integrative account by emphasizing their shared recognition of creolization as the 
potential catalyst o f "new world order."
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19. William Blake, "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell." Harris said in a 1979 interview 
that he has "always greatly and spontaneously admired from my youth English poetry
. such as the works by [among others] Blake" (quoted in Fabre 47). For comparisons of 
Harris with Blake, see Louis James 39; and Michael Gilkes, Wilson Harris 3.
20. Harris has called himself a "kind of Christian Gnostic . . . Not Gnostic in the extreme 
sense in which the Cathars were Gnostics. They said that the Creation was the work of a 
demiurge. I can't accept that" (quoted in Riach 56).
21. See Hena Maes-Jelinek, "Myth"; Sandra Drake, chapter one; and Antonio Benitez- 
Rojo, chapter five. The myth of El Dorado itself has become a spiritual trope; as Harris 
notes in "Tradition and the West Indian Novel," the El Dorado myth "has begun to 
acquire a residual pattern of illuminating correspondences. El Dorado, City o f Gold, City 
o f God" (Harris, Tradition 35).
22. Waldo has, even here, conflated the two New Testament recordings of Christ’s 
"mustard seed" teachings on faith; in Luke 17:6, Christ is recorded as saying "If you have 
faith as small as a mustard seed, you can say to this mulberry tree, ‘Be uprooted and 
planted in the sea,’ and it will obey you." The error could have been unintentional; or it 
could have been intentional, pointing forward to Waldo’s "mockingly strange, trivial 
questions" about the veracity of the Bible and the disparities in the synoptic gospels:
"Why did the women in Mark see only one angel and the women in Luke two? Could a 
story be told in opposite ways and both ways be true? Could it?" (Story 67).
23. Although it is doubtful that Schreiner would have read Augustine’s On Genesis 
Against the Manicheans at the time she wrote Story (in her early 20's), it is interesting to 
note that Augustine, too, equates Day One of creation with the period of infancy, and Day 
Two with childhood (although Schreiner’s childhood occupies both stage two and three 
in her narrative).
24. According to Genesis 1:2, water existed before the creation of the universe: "And 
the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And 
the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters."
25. Cf. 1 Corinthians 13:12: "For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to 
face: now I know in part; but then I shall know even as also I am known." (Jeremy 
Taylor, by the way, was a seventeenth-century clergyman whose writings greatly 
influenced John Wesley, the founder o f Methodism.)
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26. Augustine offers a fascinating interpretation of how the seventh day encompasses the 
former six. He argues that God created only one day, which recurred seven times: " . . .  
it is not clear when God created the seventh day, which is called the Sabbath. For on that 
day He made nothing; indeed, on that seventh day He rested from what He had made on 
the six days. How, then, did He rest on a day He did not create? . . . Perhaps we should 
say that God created only one day, so that by its recurrence many periods called days 
would pass by. It was not necessary, then, for Him to create the seventh day, for the 
seventh recurrence of the day God had created made it [i.e., the "seventh day" in Genesis 
2]" (Augustine, On Genesis Against the Manicheans, Book Four, Chapter 20).
27. In reading the creation of Adam and Eve concomitantly with the Genesis One 
narrative, I am following the exegetical tradition that reads the two narratives together: 
that is, that reads Genesis 2:7-25 as simply a more detailed account of what is going on in 
Genesis 1:27.
28. Waldo’s "grotesque" attempt to create something new (a carving) out of something 
old (the figures of the men and birds he sees everywhere around him) can be read as yet 
another mise-en-abime ofSchreiner’s "failed" allegory in "Times and Seasons."
29. Schreiner considered the "Allegory of the Hunter" to be her finest work, and later 
excerpted it for publication on its own as simply "The Hunter" (Avrech-Berkman 50). So 
moved by the allegory was the influential nineteenth-century philosopher Herbert 
Spencer that he requested it be read to him on his deathbed (51).
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